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Abstract
Executive compensation has been controversial for many years. Controversies over executive pay have sparked
outrage from some sectors and calls for increased regulation and reform. Yet others argue that knee-jerk
reactions to perceived abuses of pay can lead to a host of unintended and inefficient outcomes. This paper
argues that much of this controversy is due to executives being rewarded via contracts that have weaknesses in
design. We argue that few stakeholders in firms would object to generous compensation for managers whose
performance results in abnormally high long-term shareholder wealth creation. We state a set of principles,
developed from a review of the extensive theoretical, regulatory, and empirical literature, that we offer as
fundamental building blocks for designing executive remuneration systems in public firms, especially where
ownership and control are separated. Our purpose is to generate broad debate and discussion leading to a
consensus as to the principles that should be present in all executive compensation contracts such that the
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ABSTRACT 
Executive compensation has been controversial for several decades. Recent controversies over 
executive pay have sparked outrage from some sectors and calls for increased regulation and reform. 
Yet others argue that knee-jerk reactions to perceived abuses of pay can lead to a host of unintended 
and inefficient outcomes. This paper argues that much of this controversy is due to executives being 
rewarded via contracts that have weaknesses in design. We argue that few stakeholders in firms would 
object to generous compensation for managers whose performance results in abnormally high long-
term shareholder wealth creation. We state a set of principles, developed from a review of the 
extensive theoretical, regulatory and empirical literature, that we suggest should be the fundamental 
building blocks for designing executive remuneration systems in public firms, especially where 
ownership and control is separated. Our purpose is to generate broad debate and discussion leading to 
a consensus as to the principles that should be present in all executive compensation contracts such that 
the interests of shareholders and managers are aligned. 
 
 
* We are grateful for suggestions by Alex Frino, Doug Foster, Talis Putnins, as well as workshop participants at 






CEO compensation is controversial. While some examples of CEO misbehaviour are quite recent and 
thus well-remembered1, Murphy (2013) demonstrates that CEO pay was controversial in the US even 
before the Great Depression of the 1930s. 
CEOs of public companies are routinely perceived to be overpaid and their boards are perceived to 
provide poor monitoring and control of powerful executives. There are three elements to these 
complaints (Kaplan, 2013), namely that (i) CEOs are overpaid and their pay keeps increasing; (ii) CEO pay 
is not linked to performance; and (iii) corporate boards are ineffective monitors. Bebchuk and Fried 
(2005, p. 2) claim that, “flawed compensation arrangements have not been limited to a small number of 
‘bad apples’; they have been widespread, persistent, and systemic”.  
The US regulatory response to the Enron and WorldCom collapses (among many other high profile 
failures) was to introduce far-reaching corporate governance reforms in the Sarbanes-Oxley legislation 
of 2002, while the Dodd-Frank legislation of 2010 followed the global financial crisis (GFC). Dodd-Frank 
requires that, among many other things, all public companies obtain an annual advisory shareholder 
vote on top executive pay2. The Australian response to perceived abuses of termination payments 
resulted in amendments to the Corporations Act 2001 that restrict giving benefits greater than one 
year’s base salary on retirement from a board or managerial office, unless shareholders approve the 
benefit. Australian remuneration rules were also recently, and many argue controversially, amended to 
introduce the ‘two strikes’ rule which became effective from 1 July 20113. Under the two strikes rule, if 
25 per cent of shareholders at a company’s annual general meeting (AGM) vote against the company’s 
remuneration report the first time, directors are put on notice to review their remuneration policies. 
The second and final strike is delivered if, at the following year’s AGM, 25 per cent of shareholders again 
vote against the remuneration report. Further, if at least 50 per cent of shareholders present at the 
meeting vote for a board spill, directors must face re-election within 90 days4. However, whether these 
                                                          
1
 For example, the Enron and WorldCom collapse, the US option backdating scandal of the early-2000s, high-risk 
lending in the US residential real estate market and compensation systems that encouraged excessive risk-taking in 
financial institutions which led, among many other factors, to the global financial crisis, and termination payments 
that were perceived to be overly generous. 
2
 Kaplan (2013) shows that top executive pay policies at over 98% of S&P 500 and Russell 3000 companies received 
majority shareholder support in the Dodd-Frank mandated ‘Say-On-Pay’ votes in 2011. 
3
 The Corporations Amendment (Improving Accountability on Director and Executive Remuneration) Act 201 (Cth). 
4
 Lee and Shan (2014) have a current research project on the two strikes rule in Australia. They find that, among all 
ASX listed firms, there are 99 first strikes in 2011, and 124 strikes in 2012. Twenty-three of these firms have two 
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regulatory reforms will achieve their intentions without severe unintended consequences remains 
somewhat clouded. A central theme of Murphy (2013)’s paper is that the history of regulatory 
intervention into CEO pay in the US suggests that unintended consequences abound. 
This paper argues that much of this controversy is due to executives being rewarded via contracts 
that have weaknesses in design. We argue that few stakeholders in firms would object to generous 
compensation for managers whose performance results in abnormally high long-term shareholder 
wealth creation. We state a set of principles, developed from a review of the extensive theoretical, 
regulatory and empirical literature, that we suggest should be the fundamental building blocks for 
designing executive remuneration systems in public firms, especially where ownership and control is 
separated. Our purpose is to generate broad debate and discussion, hopefully leading to a consensus as 
to the principles that should be present in all executive compensation contracts such that the interests 
of shareholders and managers are aligned. 
 
2. THEORIES OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 
There are two main ‘camps’ in relation to CEO compensation, and it is quite clear that opinions are 
dramatically and sometimes heatedly divided5. One group of researchers, the efficient contracting camp, 
argues and finds that CEO compensation is set in a competitive equilibrium with appropriate incentive 
structures to motivate managers to maximize shareholder wealth. The other dominant group, the 
managerial power camp, argues that CEO compensation is set through managers exercising power over 
ineffective boards of directors. The two groups engage in robust debate, though occasionally this 
becomes somewhat inflamed.  
Murphy (2013) suggests that any discussion of CEO compensation that ignores developments in 
government regulatory and tax policy in relation to the CEO pay controversy is likely to ignore an 
important aspect of the way in which executive pay, particularly in the US, has evolved. Thus a third 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
strikes in 2012. Their preliminary results also show that the market reaction following the AGM meeting for a ‘first 
strike’ in 2011 is negative and significant. 
5
 Bertrand (2009) reviews three main explanations: a principle-agent view, a rent extraction view and a market-
based view. The market-based view argues that the market has played an increasingly important role in setting 
CEO compensation because a growing share of CEOs are externally recruited as the demand for CEOs shifts away 
from firm-specific skills toward more general skills. This shift has intensified the competition among firms for 
managerial talent, resulting in higher equilibrium compensation in the CEO market (see section 3.2.3 in Bertrand 
2009). The market-based view can be considered to be a part of the efficient contracting perspective. 
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aspect of executive compensation considers regulatory issues, and in particular some of the unintended 
consequences of regulatory reform of CEO remuneration. Finally, CEOs are subject to the laws of the 
land, and these laws spell out the legal obligations of executives of corporations. It is interesting to note 
that both Australian and US corporations law6 requires that directors and officers put the interests of 
the corporation before their own interests. 
2.1 Efficient Contracting Theories 
The efficient-contracting camp, with its theoretical roots in optimal contracting theory, maintains 
that the “observed level and composition of compensation reflects a competitive equilibrium in the 
market for managerial talent, and that incentives are structured to optimize firm value” (Murphy, 2013, 
p. 214). One often-discussed benefit of equity-based compensation is that this can reduce agency costs 
associated with the separation of ownership and control (see Berle and Means, 1932 and Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976) by better aligning the incentives of the CEO with those of the shareholders. Smith and 
Watts (1982) describe long-term incentive plans as a means whereby agency costs can be controlled, in 
particular costs associated with a manager’s risk aversion. Managers have a considerable portion of 
their wealth tied up in the firms they manage and hence they hold a portfolio with considerable 
exposure to firm-specific (idiosyncratic) risk. This may cause them to be risk averse in their investment 
and financing decisions for the firms they manage. Shareholders, on the other hand, can easily diversify 
away from such firm-specific risks and hence want to encourage managerial risk taking. One way in 
which this conflict can be reduced is to tie management compensation to firm performance, thus 
motivating managers to make shareholder value-increasing decisions and improving the pay-
performance sensitivity (see also Holmstrom, 1979, Harris and Raviv, 1979, Grossman and Hart, 1983 
and Smith and Stulz, 1985).  
Hirshleifer and Suh (1992) argue that option-based managerial compensation can reduce agency 
costs associated with both risk aversion and incentives to reduce effort. Consequently, shareholders 
would prefer the composition of executive remuneration to contain more equity-linked payments than 
cash payments. However, it needs to be remembered that the value a CEO places on a share of 
restricted stock or the grant of an executive option “will be strictly less than the fair market value of the 
share” (Murphy, 2013, p. 229). 
                                                          
6
 The US business judgment rule specifies that the court will not review the business decisions of directors who 
performed their duties (1) in good faith (2) with the care that an ordinarily prudent person in a like position would 
exercise under similar circumstances; and (3) in a manner the directors reasonably believe to be in the best 
interests of the corporation. The Australian Corporations Act 2001 (s 180) contains similar provisions. 
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Shleifer and Vishny (1997) argue that in the case of incomplete contracting where managers have 
more information than outsiders (i.e., analysts and shareholders) managers have residual control rights 
that provide incentives for self-interested behaviour. Long-term equity based compensation offers one 
solution to this problem, accordingly firm performance is positively affected when managers are granted 
equity-based compensation. 
2.2 Managerial Power Theories 
The managerial power camp argues that both the level and composition of CEO pay is determined 
through managers exercising their power over captive boards. A series of papers by Yermack (1995, 
1997, 2006a, 2006b, 2009), Bebchuk and Fried (2003, 2004, 2006), Bebchuk et al. (2002, 2010) and 
Bebchuk and Grinstein (2005) exemplify this view. Yermack (1995) finds that few agency and financial 
contracting theories have explanatory power for patterns of CEO stock option awards, while Yermack 
(2006a) focuses on a CEO’s personal use of corporate jets, finding that firms that disclose this 
managerial benefit underperform by more than four per cent annually. An initial disclosure 
announcement share price effect of -1.1 per cent is documented. Yermack (2006b) studies the 
severance pay of 179 CEOs who left Fortune 500 firms, showing that more than half receive severance 
pay worth on average $US 5.4 million. A large majority of this severance pay is made on a discretional 
basis by the board of directors, not in accord with the CEO’s employment contract. Yermack (2009) 
samples 1,013 major gifts by CEOs to their family foundations between 2003 and 2005 and finds that 
CEOs make their gifts just before their stock price falls, maximizing their income tax refunds.  
Bebchuk et al. (2002) and Bebchuk and Fried (2003) argue that managerial power and rent 
extraction are likely to have an important influence on the design of executive compensation contracts, 
while Bebchuk and Fried (2006) argue a similar case of managerial capture. Their 2004 book provides a 
“detailed account of how corporate boards have failed to negotiate with executives and how pay 
practices have decoupled compensation from performance, leading to practices that dilute manager 
incentives and hurt shareholders” (Bebchuk and Fried, 2006, p. 2). They argue that making board 
decision-making at arm’s length from the power of CEOs is tortuous and that substantial additional 
corporate governance reform is necessary to give shareholders greater scrutiny over boards, and boards 
greater control over CEOs. Bebchuk and Fried (2004) show that US boards have been able to camouflage 




Bebchuk et al. (2010) study the timing of CEO option grants, a topic that has been subject to 
considerable recent SEC legal action, resulting in dozens of US CEOs and directors being forced to resign. 
The 2010 study finds: “Overall, our analysis provides support for the view that opportunistic timing 
practices reflect governance breakdowns and raise governance concerns. In particular, we find that: 
opportunistic timing was correlated with factors associated with greater CEO influence on corporate 
decision-making, such as a lack of a majority of independent directors or a long-serving CEO; grants to 
independent directors were also opportunistically timed, and this timing was not merely a byproduct of 
simultaneous awards to executives or of firms routinely timing all option grants; and lucky grants to 
independent directors were associated with more CEO luck and CEO compensation”. (p. 2364) Bebchuk 
and Grinstein (2005) examine the growth of US executive pay during the period 1993–2003. They show 
that pay increased by substantially more that can be explained by changes in firm size, performance, 
and industry classification. Mean compensation in 2003 would have been only about half its actual size 
had the relationships that existed in 1993 been maintained. Equity-based compensation increased 
considerably for both new-economy and old-economy firms; this growth was not accompanied by a 
reduction in non-equity rewards. 
2.3 Unintended Regulatory Consequences 
Murphy (2013) comprehensively reviews the evolution of executive pay in the US with a particular 
emphasis on the role of government intervention. He argues that the ‘efficient contracting’ and 
‘managerial power’ camps are not mutually exclusive. As an example, he argues that a series of papers 
(Murphy, 2002, Murphy 2003 and Hall and Murphy, 2003) show that the escalation of option grants in 
the 1990s was because boards and executives (erroneously) regarded option grants as being free. 
Murphy (2013) argues that treating the two theories (efficient contracting and managerial power) of 
managerial compensation as competing hypotheses has not been productive, because they ignore 
critical political, tax, accounting and other influences on managerial pay. In Section 3 of this paper, 
Murphy develops the central theme of his study, namely that government intervention has been “both a 
response to and a major driver of time trends in executive compensation over the past century, and that 
any explanation for pay that ignores political factors is critically incomplete” Murphy (2013, p. 249). This 
review spans the controversy over executive compensation and the regulatory responses from the 30 
years before the Great Depression, during the Great Depression of the 1930s, during the rise (and fall) of 
the use of restricted stock options between 1950-1969, during the wage and price controls that existed 
in the economic stagnation of the US from 1970-1982, the development of the market for corporate 
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control in the period 1983-1992, the stock option explosion of 1992-2001, the accounting and 
backdating scandals of 2001-2007, pay restrictions imposed during Treasury’s troubled asset relief 
program (TARP) recipients during 2008-2009 and the Dodd-Frank Executive Compensation Reform Act 
from 2010-2011. Murphy (2013) provides several instances of (i) knee-jerk regulatory intervention to 
isolated perceived abuses in pay having adverse unintended consequences and (ii) reactions to 
situations where CEOs are perceived to be getting richer while lower-level workers suffer, giving rise to 
increased disclosure rules, limits on CEO pay tax deductibility and the wide-ranging pay regulations of 
the 2010 Dodd-Frank Act. Murphy notes (p. 249) that “the demands to reform (or punish) CEO pay are 
concentrated in ‘third parties’ angry with perceived levels of excessive pay, and not shareholders 
concerned about insufficient links between pay and performance”. Murphy (2011, abstract) summarizes 
the legal history of CEO pay regulation in the US as follows “Over the past 80 years, Congress has 
imposed tax policies, accounting rules, disclosure requirements, direct legislation, and myriad other 
rules to regulate executive pay. With few exceptions, the regulations have generally been either 
ineffective or counterproductive, typically increasing (rather than reducing) CEO pay and leading to a 
host of unintended consequences, including the explosion in perquisites in the 1970s, golden parachute 
plans in the 1980s, stock options in the 1990s, and restricted stock in the 2000s”. 
2.4 Legal Perspective 
Australian regulations in relation to employment of executives in the private sector are contained 
primarily in the Fair Work Act 2009 and the Corporations Act 2001, though statutes in relation to 
discrimination, privacy and misleading and deceptive conduct are also of relevance. These legal issues 
are canvassed in a publication by Clayton Utz (2012). The Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) requires that a 
company director or other officer exercise their powers and discharge their duties with care and 
diligence [s 180]. This duty is subject to a business judgment rule that requires a director making a 
business judgment to: 
 make the judgment in good faith and for a proper purpose; 
 not to have a material personal interest in the subject matter of the judgment; 
 inform themselves about the subject matter of the judgment to the extent they reasonably 
believe to be appropriate; 
 rationally believe that the judgment is in the best interests of the corporation. 
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In addition, directors and other officers of companies must exercise their powers and discharge their 
duties in good faith in the best interests of the corporation and for a proper purpose [s 181]. They are 
prohibited from improperly using their position to gain an advantage for themselves or someone else or 
to cause detriment to the corporation [s 182] and are prohibited from using information obtained as a 
consequence of their role with the company to gain an advantage for themselves or someone else or to 
cause detriment to the corporation [s 183]. These last two provisions also apply to employees of the 
company. 
The Corporations Act 2001 also (recently) restricts giving benefits greater than one year’s base 
salary on retirement from a board or managerial office, unless shareholders approve the benefit.7 These 
restrictions cover anyone who has been a director of a company at any time during the three previous 
years and, for listed companies, key members of management and / or the five highest paid executives 
over the prior 12-month period. ASX Listing Rules in relation to termination payments also apply to 
companies listed on the exchange. Specifically, a listed company is obliged to ensure that no officer will 
be entitled to a termination benefit if a change occurs in the shareholding control of the company 
(Listing rule 10.18) unless such termination payments are agreed to by shareholders at a general 
meeting (Listing rule 10.19). 
In essence the legal view is inconsistent with agency-based arguments. Agency arguments are based 
on an assumption that executives will act in their own interests, though the parties they contract with 
are aware of these incentives and incorporate bonding and monitoring arrangements to control the 
potential conflict. The legal view however states that executives must not act in their own interests and 
must put the interests of the corporation first. 
 
3. GLOBAL TRENDS IN EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 
3.1 US Evidence 
While there are many other papers that describe executive compensation for US executives, we 
draw on the recent monograph-length paper by Murphy (2013) to provide graphical representations of 
the current and historical levels of payment to US CEOs in S&P 500 firms. Few would doubt the seminal 
and on-going contributions that Kevin Murphy has made to the development of executive 
                                                          
7
 Retirement is broadly defined to include loss of office and resignation. 
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remuneration, and hence a reliance on his recent work to ‘paint the picture’ for the US is warranted. 
Figure 2.1 (reproduced with Kevin Murphy's permission from Murphy, 2013) below shows mean and 
median 2011 pay for CEOs of 465 S&P 500 corporations. Several key statistics are worthy of note: 
 Average total compensation is estimated at $11.6 million (based on grant date valuations) or 
$12.3 million, based on realized pay. Median compensations, reflecting the considerable 
skew in executive compensation, are $9.6 and $7.8 million respectively. 
 The biggest component of executive compensation is associated with stock awards (both 
restricted stock and performance shares). Stock awards now comprise between 31 per cent 
and 34 per cent of total mean and median compensation for US CEOs. 
 Base salary is between 14 per cent and 18 per cent of mean total compensation, and 11 per 
cent to 13 per cent of median total compensation. 
 Stock options comprise 18 per cent or 19 per cent of mean total compensation, while 
options grants represent 16 per cent of median grant-date total compensation. 
 Non-equity incentive payments, which represent payouts during the current year for the 
current year and prior year awards, range between 18 per cent and 24 per cent of mean 




Figure 2.1    2010 pay for CEOs in S&P 500 companies 
 
  
Note:   Figure 2.1 is based on proxy statement  information   compiled  in Standard  & Poors’ ExecuComp  
database  for 498 S&P  500  firms  with  fiscal  closings  between  June  2010  and  May  2011,  based  on  
ExecuComp’s  November  2011 update . 
Grant-date Pay: 
Base Salary and Discretionary Bonus reflects amounts actually received for the fiscal year 
Non-Equity Incentives evaluated at target level (or average of minimum and maximum if target not 
reported) Stock Options evaluated at grant date using firm-estimated  present value (typically Black-
Scholes (1973) calculations) 
Stock Awards evaluated at grant-date using firm-estimated  present value (typically grant-date market 
price), including both time-lapse restricted stock and performance shares. 
Other Compensation includes perquisites, signing bonuses, termination payments, above-market 
interest paid on deferred compensation, and the change in the actuarial value of pension benefits. 
Realized Pay: 
Base Salary and Discretionary Bonus reflects amounts actually received for the fiscal year 
Non-Equity Incentives defined as payouts during the fiscal year (including payouts on awards made in 
prior years) Stock Options defined as gains executive realized by exercising options during the fiscal 
year 
Stock Awards defined as value of awards vesting during the fiscal year (valued on the date of vesting) 
Other Compensation includes perquisites, signing bonuses, termination payments, above-market 
interest paid on deferred compensation,  and pension benefits paid during the year. 
The pay-composition  percentages for Average Compensation  are calculated as the average ratio of each 
component to total compensation for each CEO. The composition percentages for Median Compensation  are 
calculated as the median ratio of each component: median ratios do not sum to 100% (because the sum of 




Figure 2.3 from Murphy (2013) (reproduced with permission) shows average total executive 
compensation for S&P 500 firms for the period 1970 to 2011 (expressed in 2011 purchasing power) and 
its division into equity and non-equity components. Several things are worthy of note, in particular: 
 Total pay increased from around $1.1 million in 1970 to $10.9 million in 2011, down from a 
peak of $18.2 million in 2000. Thus over this 42 year period CEO pay for S&P 500 firms 
outstripped inflation by a factor of approximately 10. 
 Non-equity pay, which includes base salaries, payouts from short-term and long-term bonus 
plans, deferred compensation and other benefits, increased from around $1.1 million in 
1970 to approximately $4.1 million in 2011. Thus non-equity pay increases outstripped CPI 
adjustments by a factor of approximately four. 
 The growth in equity-linked pay, which includes the grant date values of stock options and 
restricted stock, is far more dramatic. In the period 1970 to 1978 total pay is almost entirely 
comprised of non-equity pay. However, by 2011 equity pay averages around $6.8 million.  
 While it is not claimed to be causal, it is interesting to note that just a few years after Jensen 
and Meckling’s (1976) paper on agency theory, the switch toward the use of equity pay as 
part of CEO compensation starts to emerge. By 1998 equity pay became the majority part of 
total executive compensation, and this is maintained in each year through to 2011. 
 However, as noted by Kaplan (2013, p. 9), while CEOs “earn a great deal, they are not 
unique. Other groups with similar backgrounds – private company executives, corporate 
lawyers, hedge fund investors, private equity investors and others – have seen significant 
pay increases where there is a competitive market for talent and managerial power 




Figure 2.3    Average Equity and Non-equity Grant-Date Pay for CEOs in S&P 500 Firms, 1970-2010 
 
  
Note: Compensation data are based on all CEOs included in the S&P 500, using data from Forbes and 
ExecuComp. CEO total pay includes cash pay, restricted stock, payouts from long-term pay programs 
and the value of stock options granted (using company fair-market valuations, when available, and 
otherwise using ExecuComp’s modified Black- Scholes approach). Average (median) equity 
compensation prior to 1978 estimated based on option compensation in 73 large manufacturing firms 
(based on Murphy (1985)), equity compensation from 1979 through 1991 estimated as amounts 
realized from exercising stock options during the year, rather than grant-date  values. Non-equity 
incentive pay is based on actual payouts rather than targets, since target payouts were not available 
prior to 2006. Dollar amounts are converted to 2010-constant dollars using the Consumer Price Index. 
 
Figure 2.4 below is also reproduced from Murphy (2013), again with permission. It highlights 
important trends in both the composition and level of median grant-date pay for CEOs over the years 
1992-2011. Of note are the following points: 
 Median total pay in Figure 2.4 in each year is significantly below mean pay in Figure 2.3, 
reflecting the skewness in pay distributions for US CEOs. 
 Much of the growth in median total pay between 1992 and 2011 is due to an escalation in 
stock-option compensation between 1993-2001 coupled with a dramatic shift away from 
stock option grants towards restricted stock from between 2002 and 2011. 
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 In 1992 base salaries are about 41 per cent of the $2.9 million median total CEO 
compensation package, while stock options accounted for about 25 per cent. By 2001, base 
salaries are only about 18 per cent of the median pay package, while options are more than 
50 per cent. 
 In 2011 more than two-thirds of median total pay is in the form of equity-based 
compensation. 
Figure 2.4    Median Grant-date Compensation for CEOs in S&P 500 Firms, 1992-2010 
 
 
Note: Compensation data are based on all CEOs included in the S&P 500, using data from 
ExecuComp. CEO grant-date pay includes cash pay, payouts from long-term pay programs, and the 
grant-date value of stock and option a wards (using company fair-market valuations, when available, 
and otherwise using ExecuComp’s modified Black-Scholes approach). Monetary amounts are 
converted to 2010-constant US dollars using the Consumer Price Index. 
 
3.2 International CEO Pay Trends  
Having reviewed growth in CEO payments in the US, the question of whether US executives are paid 
more than their international counterparts somewhat naturally arises. This issue is taken up in a recent 
paper by Fernandes et al (2013). The paper argues, contrary to widely accepted views in the executive 
compensation literature that US CEOs are paid significantly more than those in other nations (see 
Murphy, 1999 and Bebchuk et al., 2002 for example), that the US pay “premium is economically modest 
and primarily reflects performance-based pay demanded by institutional shareholders and independent 
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boards” (Fernandes et al. 2013, Abstract, p. 323). International comparisons of CEO pay are difficult 
because regulations in relation to pay disclosures are different. An exception is however the UK where 
CEO pay disclosures have been mandated since 1995. While Conyon and Murphy (2000) show that US 
CEOs earn almost twice UK CEOs in 1997 (after controlling for industry, firm size and a variety of firm 
and individual characteristics), Conyon et al. (2011) show that the pay premium of US to UK CEOs had 
fallen to 40 per cent by 2003, and this premium can be further reduced after adjusting for the risk 
inherent in undiversified CEO equity portfolios. Fernandes et al. (2013) use data from 14 countries that 
required detailed CEO pay disclosures by 2006. Their sample of 1,648 US and 1,615 non-US firms (with 
revenues greater than $US1 billion) comprise nearly 90 per cent of the 2006 market capitalization of 
publicly listed firms in these countries. They show that US CEOs earn an average of 26 per cent more 
than their foreign equivalents in 2006, far lower than that documented in prior academic research. Their 
experiment controls for ownership and board structure (US firms tend to have higher institutional 
ownership and more independent boards) in addition to the usual firm-specific attributes (size, industry, 
stock price volatility and performance and growth opportunities) and CEO characteristics (age, tenure, 
education and past experience). Figure 1 and 2 from Fernandes et al. (2013) provide the main features 
of their findings, which can be summarized as: 
 When controls for only firm size and industry are considered, US CEOs earn substantially 
more than non-US CEOs. When additional controls for other firm characteristics, ownership, 
and board characteristics are included, US CEOs have effective parity in pay levels with other 
Anglo-Saxon nations (UK, Ireland, Australia and Canada) as well as Germany, Italy and 
Switzerland. 
 When the results after risk adjustment using the Hall and Murphy (2002) approach are 
considered, again with controls for only firm size and industry, the US estimated pay using 
the ‘certainty equivalence’ approach is $2.1 million, and this is statistically higher than the 
non-US pay of $1.46 million. When additional controls are introduced the results show that 
US CEO pay is significantly less than in the UK and Australia, and insignificantly different to 
CEO pay in Canada, Italy, Ireland and Switzerland.  
 
3.3 Australian CEO Pay  
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We used the Sirca Limited Corporate Governance database to produce mean and median pay levels 
for Australian listed firms for the years 2001-2012, as well as the average over all years. The results, 
which are expressed in December 2012 purchasing power units, are in Tables 1 - 6 and Figures 1 - 6 
below. Table 1 covers all firms in the database, a total of 11,281 firm years or an average of 940 firms 
per year. Table 2 relates to the top 100 firms by market capitalization each year, while Table 3 and 4 
cover the top 200 and top 300 firms respectively. Table 5 relates to medium sized Australian firms, 
represented by firms in the top 101-300 by market capitalization. Finally, Table 6 covers small listed 
firms, defined as all firms in the database other than the top 300. A corresponding figure is provided for 
each of these tables. At this stage we have not attempted to control for firm characteristics nor have we 
attempted to investigate pay-performance relationships. The Sirca corporate governance database 
captures companies that represent well over 95 per cent of total ASX market capitalization. The 
following points summarize the main descriptive statistics in Tables 1 - 6 and Figures 1 - 6. 
 Mean (median) total compensation for all companies in Table 1 grew from $0.714 million to 
$1.210 ($0.355 million to $0.644 million) million between 2001 and 2012. Thus CEO pay has 
grown faster than the Australian CPI. There is a clear pattern of higher pay for the larger 
companies. The mean (median) average total compensation over the 12 years are as 
follows: 
o Top 100 firms (large firms in Table 2) $4.180 million and $3.080 million 
o Top 200 firms (Table 3) $2.916 million and $1.818 million 
o Top 300 firms (Table 4) $2.282 million and $1.281 million 
o Top 101-300 firms (medium size firms in Table 5) $1.333 million and $0.927 million, 
and 
o Firms ranked 301 and higher (small firms in Table 6) $0.460 million and $0.341 
million. 
 Equity based compensation for all firms in Table 1 is 20.2 per cent of mean total 
compensation and 12.2 per cent of median total compensation over all sample years 2001-
2012. Again there is a very clear pattern in relation to firm size, with the proportion of total 
compensation paid in the form of equity rising as firm size increases. The mean and median 
proportions of equity compensation to total compensation are as follows from Tables 2 to 6: 
o The largest firms (top 100) - mean proportion 23.0 per cent, median 23.4 per cent 
o The largest 200 firms – mean proportion 21.5 per cent, median 18.1 per cent 
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o The largest 300 firms – mean proportion 21.4 per cent, median 20.0 per cent 
o Medium sized firms (top 101-300) – mean proportion 18.9 per cent, median 16.9 
per cent 
o Small firms (301 and up) – mean proportion 17.4 percent, median 10.0 per cent 
 
Thus the equity component of Australian CEO compensation is much lower than in the US, 
where the equity-based component of total compensation has exceeded 50 per cent in each 
of the years from 1998.  
 There is a clear trend upward in the use of equity based compensation, with mean (median) 
proportions in Table 1 for all firms in 2001 being 8.6 per cent (3.9 per cent), with these rising 
to 25.1 (17.2) per cent by 2012, respectively. This growth in the use of equity based 
compensation is more pronounced in the larger firms than for smaller firms. Specifically 
Table 2 to 6 show that between 2001 and 2012 equity forms of compensation as a 
proportion of total compensation has increased as follows: 
o Table 2 (the largest firms) the growth is from 9.1 per cent to 30.4 per cent 
o Table 3 (top 200 firms) the growth is from 10.5 per cent to 27.0 per cent 
o Table 4 (top 300 firms) the growth is from 9.8 per cent to 26.1 per cent 
o Table 5 (medium sized firms) the growth is from 10.7 per cent to 19.5 per cent, and 
o Table 6 (small firms) the growth in equity based compensation as a proportion of 
total compensation between 2001 and 2012 is from 5.8 per cent to 23.2 per cent. 
These proportions are however somewhat misleading because the average equity 
based payment in 2001 to small firms is only $19,226 per firm, and this rose to 
$157,936 per firm by 2012. Among the top 100 firms equity based compensation 
dwarfs these values with mean equity based compensation rising from an average 
of $234,287 in 2001 to $1,139,360 by 2012. 
 Yearly growth figures show that mean and median CEO compensation for all firms in Table 1 
grew quite strongly from 2001-2007, but the GFC has stopped this trend, resulting in mean 
CEO compensation in 2012 at approximately the same level as in 2007. Median CEO pay has 
however continued to show modest growth from 2007 to 2012. The levels of pay for the top 
100 firms have however declined quite dramatically between 2007 (where the average total 
compensation for a CEO of a top 100 firm was $5.890 million) and 2012 (where the average 
pay was $3.744 million). On average a top 100 CEO in Australia is about $2 million worse off 
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in 2012 than he / she was in 2007. Among the top 200 firms the drop in average pay 
between 2007 and 2012 is $1.378 million, for the top 300 firms it is $0.985 million and for 
medium size firms the average CEO salary drop by $0.404 million. Small firm CEO total 
compensation bucks this trend, rising from $0.518 million in 2007 to $0.680 million in 2012. 
 Irrespective of the groupings we form however, Australian CEO total compensation (both 
means and medians) have outstripped the CPI over the 12 years we summarize. These 
trends are clearly evident in each of the figures we provide. The increase is largely 
attributable to equity compensation in each group. For example, equity compensation in 
top 100 firms rises by $905,073 meaning that top 100 firms’ total compensation outstrips 
inflation by almost one million dollars.  
 
4. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE ON EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 
There is an extensive literature on CEO compensation with a particular focus on US public firms (see 
for example review articles by Frydman and Jenter, 2010, Murphy, 1999 and 2013, Jensen and Murphy, 
2004, Kaplan, 2013, Ferrarini et al., 2009). We do not intend to fully canvass this voluminous work. 
Rather we attempt to draw out broad trends that emerge from review papers that involve time series 
and cross sectional examinations, and then provide a comprehensive review on the Australian-based 
evidence. 
4.1 The increase in CEO compensation 
The dramatic increase in CEO compensation of US publicly traded corporations over the past three 
decades has attracted extensive attention in academic research. Most studies rely on either the efficient 
contracting theories or managerial power theories in an attempt to explain the increase. However, as 
argued by Murphy (2013), any compelling theory must not only explain the increased level of CEO pay, 
but should also explain the explosion in option grants to lower-level executives and employees, the 
leveling of CEO pay after 2001 and the emerging dominance of restricted stock in the early 2000s. 
In the efficient-contracting camp, several general equilibrium models are recently developed by 
accommodating the shift in the relative importance of general ‘managerial capital’ or the marginal 
product of managerial ability as a function of firm size. One important change in the CEO labour market 
over the past several decades is the increased prevalence of newly appointed CEOs being hired 
externally, jumping from 15% in the 1970s to nearly one-third in the late 1990s (Murphy and Zabojnik, 
2008). Murphy and Zabojnik (2008) and Frydman (2007) therefore argue that the nature of the CEO job 
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market has changed gradually over recent years and that the demand for CEOs has shifted away from 
firm-specific capital (reflecting skills, knowledge and experience valuable only within the organization) 
towards more general managerial skills. Both papers offer general equilibrium models and attribute the 
increase in CEO wages to the increased prevalence of outside hiring and the intensified competition 
among firms for managerial talent. The above argument is further supported by the comparable rise in 
pay for top talent in other sectors with active and mobile labour markets such as athletes, lawyers, 
investment bankers and hedge fund managers during the same sample period (Kaplan and Ruah, 2010).  
On other hand, Gabaix and Landier (2008) build an equilibrium model and argue that in equilibrium 
the most skilled CEOs should be employed by the largest companies, as managerial talent has greatest 
effect in bigger firms. Accordingly, any shift in the size distribution of firms will lead to a proportional 
change in CEO pay. They show that the dramatic rise in US CEO pay since 1980 can be fully explained by 
the simultaneous growth in firm size. 
However, as Murphy (2013) argues, while the efficient-contracting theories provide important 
insights on the rise in CEO pay, they cannot explain why stock options were once the preferred form of 
equity incentives, and why this shifted to restricted stock after 2001. More importantly, the extensive 
option grants to employees well below the executive suite are also contradictory with efficient 
contracting theories.  
Compared to the efficient-contracting camp, the managerial power hypothesis is even less 
successful in explaining the increase in CEO pay. Under this hypothesis, CEOs in firms with weak 
corporate governance and acquiescent boards are able to (at least partly) determine their 
compensation, resulting in inefficiently high levels of compensation. This argument is inconsistent with 
improved board independence in US firms during the 1990s, as evidenced by the increasingly higher 
percentage of outside directors serving on the board and the CEO being the sole insider in about half of 
all firms (Murphy, 2013). In fact, it is well cited that most aspects of the corporate governance in US 
firms have improved since the 1970s, which in turn largely alleviates the influence of CEOs over board 
members (Holmstrom and Kaplan, 2001). 
In attempting to offer a managerial-power explanation, Bebchuk and Grinstein (2005) argue that 
the ‘outrage constraint’ on managerial power largely depends on stock market conditions and 
sentiment. The stock market boom in the 1990s weakened outrage and led to a dramatic increase in 
CEO pay over that decade. Conversely, outrage strengthened in the bearish market during 2000-2002, 
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resulting in the reduction in CEO pay and the use of stock options. However, as Murphy (2013) argues, a 
fundamental problem with the managerial-power hypothesis as well as the Bebchuk and Grinstein 
(2005) explanation is that ‘there is no principled way to refute any trend in pay given the authors’ 
flexible (and unmeasurable) definition of both the ‘outrage constraint’ and its importance’ (Murphy, 
2013, p. 334). 
Besides the efficient-contracting and managerial power theories, recent research also offers several 
explanations, with some success, to understand the increase in CEO pay from other perspectives such as 
perceived costs of options, disclosure requirements, tax policies and non-market mechanisms. Hall and 
Murphy (2002) argue that the greater use of stock options in the 1990s reflects the fact that many 
directors and top executives perceived options to be costless and did not understand their true 
economic cost for shareholders. The SEC disclosure rules in place during that period and the pre-2003 
NYSE listing requirement also contributed to the ‘perceived cost’ problem, as the costs of options to be 
granted were are not required to be disclosed or approved by shareholders. The perceived cost view 
may also explain the decreased use of options since 2002, as many firms voluntarily expensed options 
since early 2003 under FAS 123R which was mandated in 2006 (Murphy, 2013). In addition, Rose and 
Wolfram (2002) claim that the tax laws enacted in 1994 effectively made stock options less expensive 
than cash pay, and thus partly contributed to the explosion in stock options. 
Piketty and Saez (2003, 2006) propose an explanation based on non-market mechanisms such as 
social norms or labour market institutions. They document evidence of a U-shape pattern over the 
course of the twentieth century for the pay of those at the very top of the income distribution. They 
therefore argue that the shift in social norms towards the acceptability of extreme pay since the 1970s 
contributed to the increase in CEO compensation. 
Most empirical studies on CEO compensation limit their samples to the post-1990 period, when the 
Execucomp data are readily available for US firms. Frydman and Saks (2010), however, offer a unique 
long-term perspective by hand-collecting and examining CEO pay in top 100 (in terms of sales) US firms 
over the period of 1936-2005. In line with Piketty and Saez (2003, 2006), Frydman and Jenter (2010) 
show that CEO compensation between the end of World War II and before the mid-1970s is 
characterized by low levels of pay, little dispersion across top managers, moderate pay-performance 
sensitivities, and a weak relation between pay and firm size. From the mid-1970s to the early 2000s, 
compensation levels grew dramatically, differences in pay among CEOs widened, and equity incentives 
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tied managers’ wealth closer to firm performance and firm size. The long-term perspective presented in 
Frydman and Saks (2010) therefore reveals that the recent theoretical advances fail to explain the trend 
in CEO pay in the pre-1970 period.  
4.2 CEO incentives and pay-performance sensitivity 
Equity-based compensation is used to align the interests of shareholders and managers (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976) because decisions that increase shareholders’ wealth also increase managers’ wealth. 
To measure CEO incentives, pay-performance sensitivity is often utilized which indicates how much 
compensation depends on how well the company performs. Jensen and Murphy (1990) conceptualize 
pay-performance sensitivity as the dollar change in executive wealth associated with each dollar change 
in shareholder wealth. They document that for between 1974 and 1986 the average CEO experiences a 
change in wealth of $3.25 for each $1,000 change in firm value, and the pay-performance sensitivity 
decreases in firm size. The results therefore indicate that CEO incentives are low on average, particularly 
in large firms.  
The insensitivity of CEO wealth to performance documented in Jensen and Murphy (1990) is 
questioned by subsequent research, and alternative measures of pay-performance sensitivity are 
proposed (see Hall and Liebman, 1998; Aggarwal and Samwick, 1999; Edmans et al., 2009). For example, 
Hall and Liebman (1998) argue that the dollar changes in CEO wealth due to typical changes in firm value 
are in fact not small. They measure CEO incentives as the dollar change in CEO wealth for a percentage 
change in firm value. Murphy (1985) and Kaplan (1994) recommend the use of the elasticity of CEO 
wealth to shareholder value, which indicates the percentage change in CEO wealth for a percentage 
change in firm value. Edmans et al. (2009) and Frydman and Jenter (2010) discuss the advantages and 
disadvantages of different incentive measures. They suggest that they are all important and should be 
considered independently due to the heterogeneity of corporate activities CEOs engage in and CEO 
utility.8  
Overall, research on US firms suggests that the pay-performance sensitivity of CEO’s wealth surged 
during the 1990s, mostly due to use of executive options (Frydman and Jenter, 2010). Between 1990 
                                                          
8
 For example, the Jensen-Murphy statistic is the right measure for corporate actions whose dollar effect is not 
dependent on the size of the firm, such as overpaying for a takeover. The incentive measure suggested by Hall and 
Liebman (1998) is appropriate for activities whose impact scales with firm size (e.g., a corporate restructure). The 
elasticity measure is the right one when the effort choice of the CEO has a multiplicative impact on both firm value 
and CEO utility. 
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and 2011, CEOs are rewarded for good performance, and penalized for poor performance (Kaplan, 
2013). However, the fractional ownership of most US CEOs in the firms they manage remains low, and it 
is even lower today than it was in the 1930s (Frydman and Jenter, 2010). 
4.3 CEO pay, firm performance and corporate actions 
The issue of whether CEO incentives affect firm performance has been quite controversial, and 
there is no theoretical and empirical consensus in the literature. In a seminal study, Morck et al. (1988) 
document a nonlinear cross-sectional relation between managerial ownership and firm valuation. They 
find that firm performance is increasing in managerial ownership for ownership lower than 5% or 
greater than 25%, but decreases in ownership between 5% and 25%. While the results in Morck et al. 
(1988) imply that greater CEO incentives are not always better-aligned and tend to be worse in the 5% to 
25% ownership range, subsequent studies present mixed evidence on the effect of different aspects of 
CEO equity incentives on firm performance (see McConnell and Servaes, 1990; Mehran, 1995; Habib and 
Ljungqvist, 2005).  
In contrast, Demsetz and Lehn (1985) and Himmelberg et al. (1999) argue that observed levels of 
managerial ownership represents an equilibrium solution to agency problems. As the complex process 
of compensation arrangements involves the CEO, the compensation committee and consultants, the 
boards and the external labour market of executives, the level of compensation and incentives is / are 
determined by a large number of observable and unobservable firm and CEO characteristics. Therefore, 
the cross-sectional relation between managerial ownership and firm value is spurious. To control for the 
alleged endogeneity problem, studies by Demsetz and Lehn (1985), Loderer and Martin (1997), Cho 
(1998), Himmelberg et al. (1999), Palia (2001) and Villalonga and Amit (2006) either utilize simultaneous 
equations models or employ instrumental variables so as to identify the causal effects of managerial 
incentives on firm value. In addition, Coles et al. (2012) estimate a structural model and show that the 
documented hump-shaped relation between managerial ownership and firm value (McConnell and 
Servaes, 1990) is the outcome of firms having different productivity from physical assets and managerial 
inputs. To assess the effectiveness of standard econometric approaches to the well-known endogeneity 
problem, they conclude that fixed effects and instrumental variables do not generally provide reliable 
solutions to simultaneity bias in testing the effect of managerial ownership on firm performance.  
Given the difficulty of convincingly identifying the causal effects of managerial incentives on firm 
value, recent research endeavors to connect executive incentives to a wide variety of corporate 
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decisions and outcomes. The idea behind this is that incentives influence the decisions managers make 
which in turn impact firm value. For example, Core and Larcker (2002) examine a sample of firms 
adopting ‘target ownership plans’ and find that the required increases in managerial ownership lead to 
improvements in the firm’s operating performance. Fenn and Liang (2001) and Brown et al. (2007) find 
that executives with higher ownership are more likely to increase dividends, but Fenn and Liang (2001) 
also show that management stock options are negatively (positively) related to dividends (repurchases). 
Denis et al. (1997) suggest that managerial ownership creates incentives for managers to pursue value-
increasing investments and therefore constrains business diversification and avoids value destruction. 
With respect to managerial risk-taking, recent studies recognize the differential theoretical 
predictions regarding the relationship between firm risk and the sensitivity of executives’ wealth to firm 
risk (vega) and to changes in stock price (delta). Coles et al. (2006) and Low (2009) document a positive 
relationship between vega and firm risk, but provide mixed evidence for delta. Evidence on CEO pay and 
takeovers is also mixed. Consistent with efficient contracting, Datta et al. (2001) document a strong 
positive relation between acquiring managers’ equity-based compensation and merger performance. In 
contrast, Harford and Li (2007) compare compensation policies implemented in firms that undertake 
either acquisitions or capital expenditures (external vs. internal investment). Consistent with managerial 
power explanations, Harford and Li (2007) find that CEOs are financially better off from making 
acquisition decisions, even though these decisions typically destroy shareholder value (see also Bliss and 
Rosen, 2001). 
Overall, there is ample but often mixed evidence between CEO incentives and a variety of corporate 
policies and actions. While one may interpret this evidence as empirical validity of the widespread 
misuse of CEO compensation, an alternative is that the endogeneity of compensation arrangements 
makes it extremely difficult to interpret any observed relation between CEO compensation and 
corporate outcomes as evidence of a causal effect. A response to such a challenge in recent research is 
to identify a natural experiment such as a regulatory change and unexpected ‘shock’ to the economy 
(see for example, Brown et al., 2007 and Gormley et al., 2014). 
4.4 Australian Evidence 
4.4.1 The level of CEO pay and its determinants 
Early research (before 1999) on Australian CEO compensation typically examines the association 
between the level of CEO cash-based compensation and firm size and performance. This is largely due to 
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disclosure requirements in Australia before 1998, when information about component parts of 
remuneration is absent and unavailable for research. In addition, early research tends to rely on a small 
sample of Australian firms and/or a relatively short sample period, which makes the hand-collection of 
CEO compensation data from annual reports feasible and cost-effective. In fact, the sample size in these 
studies tends to be typically less than 100, with the only exception being Merhebi et al. (2006)9. 
Although early research on Australian CEO pay generally documents a positive association between the 
level of CEO cash-based compensation and firm size, it typically reports that cash-based compensation 
and its components are not significantly associated with prior-year or current-year firm performance 
measured by either accounting return (such as ROA or ROE) or stock return of the firm. 
For example, Izan et al. (1998) examine the relation between cash-based compensation, accounting 
and share price performance, and firm size for a sample of 99 Australian firms with available financial 
and price data from 1987 to 1992. They find no evidence of a linkage between CEO cash pay and current 
period performance, as well as prior-year performance. They discuss several alternative explanations 
and conclude that Australian CEOs have had, at least compared to US CEOs, a relatively small proportion 
of total (cash) compensation ‘at risk’. O’Neil and Iob (1999) examine 49 large Australian firms in 1997. 
They find that the level of CEO base salary and aggregate pay is positively related to firm size, but there 
is no significant relation between CEO pay and firm performance, CEO age and the number of CEO 
service years.  
Merhebi et al. (2006) conduct a large sample study on CEO cash pay for the Top 500 Australian 
public firms (based on reported profits) for the period 1990-1999.10 They find that (i) CEO pay is 
statistically positively related to firm size (CEO pay increases by 2.74 per cent for a 10 per cent increase 
in firm size, measured as revenue); and (ii) CEO pay is insignificantly related to contemporaneous 
measures of performance (return on assets, return on equity and share price performance). 
Two exceptions in early research are Matolcsy (2000) and Holland et al. (2001), which report either 
mixed or weak evidence on the relationship between CEO cash pay and firm performance. Holland et al. 
(2001) examine a sample of 26 Australian companies over 1989-1999, and find a weak positive 
relationship between CEO compensation and current period market performance (no statistics are 
                                                          
9
 This is partly because machine-readable databases that include information about executive compensation have 
not been commercially available until recently. 
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presented). Matolcsy (2000) tests how business cycles affect the association between changes in CEO 
pay and changes firm performance. Using a sample of 100 randomly selected Australian firms over 
1987-1995, Matolcsy first shows that, on average, CEO cash-based compensation increased by 13.24% 
over the sample period. The average growth rate is higher during periods of ‘Steady growth’ (15%) and 
‘Soft landing’ (24%), and lower for periods of ‘Flat recovery’ (9%) and ‘Recession’ (11%). The results 
show that the relationship between changes in CEO cash compensation and changes in financial 
performance is positive during economic growth, but is flat during an economic downturn. 
Australian regulations and disclosure requirements in relation to executive and director pay were 
amended by the Company Law Review Act 1998 (CLRA) as part of the Corporate Law Economic Reform 
Program (CLERP). The CLRA amended provisions of the Corporations Law deal with financial reporting 
and auditing for accounting periods ending on or after 1 July 1998. Since then, Australian public 
companies are required, in their directors’ report, to provide detailed information and discussions on 
the nature, amount and rationale of each element of the compensation paid to senior executives and 
board directors, including equity-based compensation. The regulation was further amended in 2004, 
including the issuance of an accounting standard (AASB1046 Director and Executive Disclosures by 
Disclosing Entities) prescribing detailed disclosure of executive and director remuneration components, 
and the CLERP (Audit Reform and Corporate Disclosure) Act 2004 (CLERP9) introducing a number of 
amendments in relation to executive compensation. 
Following the introduction of increased disclosure regulations that came into effect on 1 July 1998, 
Matolcsy and Wright (2007) provide descriptive evidence on the structure of Australian CEO pay for the 
period of 1999-2001. Using firms in the Top 500 with available data, they find 238 firm-years (34%) 
where only cash is paid to the CEO and 458 firm-years (66%) where a combination of cash- and equity-
based compensation is paid. CEO compensation is highest in the cash and equity-based compensation 
group of the banking and finance sector where the mean (median) compensation for the equity-based 
group is $1.865 million ($1.153 million). These pay levels are however much lower than in the US where 
Murphy (1999) reports median CEO compensation of $US4.582 million for 1996. 
Jeff and Taylor (2002) present the first Australian examination on executive stock options for a 
sample of 258 Australian firms in 2000. They find that large firms with better prior-year market 
performance are more likely to grant stock options to their CEOs. The percentage of stock options over 
total compensation is positively associated with firm size and prior-year stock return, but negatively 
25 
 
related to current-year accounting performance (ROA), CEO ownership and insider ownership. They 
conclude that the results are more consistent with the notion that firms with weak corporate 
governance are likely to use stock options excessively. 
As information about equity-based compensation became more publicly available, recent research 
re-examines the association between firm performance and CEO pay, using total compensation as well 
as its four different components (i.e., salary, bonus, shares and options). Evidence suggests that the 
level of CEO compensation is positively related to current-year ROA (Schultz et al., 2013), changes in ROE 
(Lee, 2009), current-year stock return (Matolcsy and Wright, 2006) as well as past-year accounting 
performance (Chalmers et al., 2006; Doucouliagos et al., 2007). For example, Doucouliagos et al. (2007) 
explore the relationship between CEO pay and performance in 10 Australian banks during 1992-2005. 
They find that CEO pay is positively related to firm size, prior-year bank performance, prior-year stock 
return and institutional ownership, but negatively associated with board size.  
However, evidence on CEO pay and firm performance is somewhat inconclusive. A number of 
studies, particularly those examining CEO pay in one particular year or over a short sample period, 
report an insignificant association between CEO pay and firm performance (Capezio et al., 2011; 
Cybinski and Windsor, 2013; Heaney et al., 2010; Walker, 2010). Walker (2010) randomly selected 50 
'high-growth' and 50 'low-growth' Australian firms. She found that performance-based pay is positively 
related to firm size and growth, but it is not significantly associated with current-year ROA, CEO 
ownership and CEO duality. Heaney et al. (2010) analyze 1,144 listed Australian firms in 2006, following 
the adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) that resulted in more detailed 
disclosure on executive compensation. They find no evidence of any significant relation between CEO 
pay and firm performance (either accounting or market performance) in the prior, current or future 
year. 
Matolcsy et al. (2009) note that prior evidence on the association between market-based measures 
of performance and stock and option-based compensation reveals both positive and negative effects, 
and thus they seek to explain these contradictory empirical results. They suggest that stock-based 
compensation can be used as a reward for past performance (in which case the market will view the 
grant as an expense) and as an incentive for future performance (in contrast, the market will view the 
grant as an asset). If stock-based compensation is a reward for past performance, a negative relationship 
is expected; whereas a positive relationship is expected if these payments are made to provide 
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incentives for future performance. They use 259 firm-year observations for 1999-2004 disclosures and 
divide these into ‘reward’ and ‘incentive’ groups using firm prior period return characteristics and the 
degree of ‘at-the-money’ of the granted options. An instrumental variables approach is used to control 
for the mechanical relationship between the value of a share and the value of an option. After 
controlling for the endogeneity, the results show a statistically positive association for the ‘incentive’ 
group; however the ‘reward’ group is statistically insignificant. 
Besides firm size and performance, research studies also endeavor to identify a variety of firm 
characteristics, CEO characteristics and corporate governance variables that explain the level of CEO 
compensation in Australia. The rationale behind this is that the determination of compensation 
arrangements is a jointly-determined process involving the CEO, the compensation committee and its 
consultants, the Board and the external labour market. 
For firm characteristics, the level of CEO compensation is found to be positively related to firm size, 
the idiosyncratic risk of the firm (Chalmers et al., 2006), growth opportunities (Heaney et al., 2010; 
Walker, 2010), Tobin’s Q (Schultz et al., 2013) and business complexity (Matolcsy and Wright, 2006), and 
negatively related to financial leverage (Schultz et al., 2013). For instance, Matolcsy and Wright (2006) 
examine the relation between CEO compensation and firm characteristics for a sample of about 250 
Australian firms among the ‘Top 500’ during 1999-2001. Consistent with efficient contracting theories, 
they find that levels of Australian CEO compensation are associated with the firm’s underlying economic 
characteristics, which explain around 41.5% of cross-sectional variation in the levels of CEO pay. The 
level of CEO compensation is found to be positively related to firm size, firm complexity (measured by 
the number of subsidiaries) and current stock price performance. 
With respect to CEO characteristics and governance variables, the level of CEO compensation is 
generally found to be positively related to board size (Chalmers et al., 2006; Heaney et al., 2010; Schultz 
et al., 2013) and institutional ownership (Doucouliagos et al., 2007), and negatively related to a CEO 
change (Capezio et al., 2011; Lee, 2009), CEO ownership (Coulton and Taylor, 2002; Chalmers et al., 
2006) and insider ownership (Coulton and Taylor, 2002). There is mixed evidence on the relation 
between CEO pay and CEO duality. Heaney et al. (2010) and Schultz et al. (2013) report a negative 
relationship, while Lee (2009) and Walker (2010) document a positive or insignificant association. O’Neil 




Importantly, prior research finds that the effectiveness of board monitoring is not significantly 
related to the level of CEO compensation (Lee, 2009; Capezio et al., 2011; Schultz et al., 2013). For 
example, Schultz et al. (2013) do not find a consistent relationship between the effectiveness of board 
monitoring activity and CEO compensation. The proportion of nonexecutive directors and the existence 
of a remuneration committee are both positively related to CEO pay, which is at odds with the notion 
that greater monitoring afforded by these characteristics would lower CEO pay. Inconsistent with the 
incentive effect, there is a negative impact of CEO duality and a CEO serving on the remuneration 
committee on CEO pay. 
Capezio et al. (2011) use top 500 ASX firms for the period of 1998-2006 and examine whether board 
structural independence is an important boundary condition for the enforcement of CEO pay-for-
performance. Employing a system Generalized Method of Moments (GMM), they find that the pay-
performance relation is not significantly different in firms whose boards are chaired by non-executives 
and dominated by non-executive directors (at both the full board and compensation committee levels). 
They also find that the level of CEO cash compensation is influenced by firm size, but not firm 
performance. They therefore conclude that the results contradict both efficient-contracting and 
managerial-power theories, and argue that policy makers’ faith in incentive plans and the moderating 
influence of structural independence per se may be misplaced. 
On the other hand, Chalmers et al. (2006) use the enhanced executive remuneration disclosure 
regulations introduced in Australia on 1 July 1998 to examine firm attributes that are associated with 
and explain differences in CEO pay levels, and whether CEO compensation and performance 
relationships are consistent with labour demand theory (efficient contracting) or rent extraction 
(managerial power). Total compensation is found to be significantly positively related to size, ROA, the 
idiosyncratic risk of the firm and board size, while a significant negative relationship is found for CEO 
ownership. When considering different components of CEO pay, they find the fixed salary and share-
based components of compensation are consistent with efficient contracting explanations, while 
bonuses and option grants are found to be consistent with rent extraction (particularly for smaller firms 
and for firms with above average performance). The rent extraction is statistically significant, though it is 
economically negligible and short-lived, in contrast to US evidence where rent extraction is wide-spread, 
persistent and economically substantial (at least according to Core et al., 1999). 
4.4.2 The trend of Australian CEO pay 
28 
 
In its report on executive remuneration, the Productivity Commission (2009, p. 41) notes that from 
1993 to 2009, average compensation of ASX100 CEOs increased in real term at an average rate of 6-7 
per cent, equivalent to an increase from 17 times average earnings in Australia in 1993 to 42 times in 
2009. The rise is significantly stronger in the 1990s (at a rate of 12%), with slower but still positive 
growth from 2000-2007.  
Pottenger and Leigh (2013) present a long-term perspective of executive compensation for BHP, the 
resources giant and one of the largest companies in Australia, over 1887-2013. Similar to the pattern in 
US CEO compensation and Australian top incomes, they find the trend in director remuneration (relative 
to average earnings) follows a U-shape. Specifically, the pay to executives and directors in BHP increased 
from the 1880s to the 1910s, trended downwards through the 1920s and into the 1930s, rose briefly 
during World War II and fell again from the 1940s until the 1980s. However, director pay has increased 
dramatically over recent decades, consistent with the average trends in executive compensation in top 
Australian firms. They therefore suggest that Australia experienced a ‘great compression’ in executive 
salaries during the post-war era, followed by the recent ‘great divergence’ in the late-twentieth century. 
The documented pattern is similar to the long-term analysis of US CEO pay and the managerial labour 
market in Frydman and Saks (2010) and Piketty and Saez (2003). 
Matolcsy et al. (2012) consider a unique setting where Australian companies have changed from 
cash bonus to equity-based compensation, and examine determinants and performance consequences 
of changes in CEO compensation structure. According to efficient contracting theories, they argue that 
the change to equity-based compensation is driven by changes in firm characteristics and by the 
occurrence of CEO turnover, the latter of which provides a less costly opportunity for such change. Using 
a sample of 2,288 firm-years over 2001-2009, they find larger firms with  more business segments and 
higher investment opportunities are more likely to change their compensation structure. The likelihood 
is also higher when there is a change in CEO in the firm. They also document a significant negative 
association between changes in compensation structure and the firm’s financial and stock price 
performance in the following year, even after controlling for CEO turnover and poor governance 
environments. They suggest that the initial change to equity-based compensation is part of an error 
learning process made by firms that leads them towards efficient CEO compensation contracts. 
Hill et al. (2011) present an insightful comparison in CEO employment contracts between Australia 
and US. They create pairs of US and Australian firms matched on firm size, industry and contract starting 
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date. They find that Australian CEOs have significantly greater base salaries than their US counterparts, 
but are less likely to be compensated with restricted stock and stock options. Interestingly, the 
employment contracts for Australian CEOs tend to be shorter than US contracts, and have more 
restrictions on CEO actions. In contrast, employment contracts for US CEOs are more likely to have 
arbitration provisions, change-in-control provisions, tax gross ups, do not compete clauses, and 
supplementary executive retirement plans (SERPs). Hill et al. (2011) suggest that some of the differences 
reflect underlying differences in the legal, regulatory and cultural environment. For example, the 
relative infrequency of change-in-control provisions in Australian contracts may be due to the more 
stringent ASX listing requirements. Vast differences in arbitration provisions may reflect cultural 
differences. However, a better understanding of institutional differences such as tax codes, takeover 
protection and corporate governance practice is still needed to help explain some remaining differences 
in CEO contracts between Australia and the US. 
4.4.3 CEO pay-performance sensitivity 
Early research on CEO pay-performance sensitivity in Australia presents mixed evidence, partly due 
to the fact that these studies use total cash-based compensation and do not include equity-based pay 
(because disclosure was not required during these sample periods). Izan et al. (1998) present 
preliminary evidence on an insignificant and close to zero pay-performance sensitivity for total cash 
compensation over 1987-1992. Merhebi et al. (2006) study the Top 500 firms over 1990-1999, and 
report evidence consistent with efficient contracting explanations. They find that: (1) changes in CEO 
cash pay is positively associated with the change in current and lagged period shareholder wealth (a CEO 
receives a 1.16 per cent increase in pay for a 10 per cent increase in shareholder wealth) and (2) CEO 
pay sensitivity decreases as the riskiness of the firm increases.  
Recent studies include both cash-based and equity-based compensation, and generally document 
statistically significant pay-performance sensitivity, albeit the magnitude is not economically significant. 
Clarkson et al. (2011) investigate the effect of increased shareholder oversight and disclosures about 
executive remuneration on the pay-performance sensitivity by controlling for contemporaneous 
changes in corporate governance practice. Using a sample of 240 firms with annual reports available for 
each year over 2001-2009, they find a general improvement in pay-performance sensitivity over the 
study period. The sensitivity increase is primarily related to enhanced remuneration disclosure and the 
non-binding shareholder vote on the remuneration report. They therefore conclude that enhanced 
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oversight of executive remuneration arrangements resulting from regulatory change has a positive 
impact on executive compensation arrangements.  
Schultz et al. (2013) examine the role of corporate governance mechanisms, namely blockholdings 
and board structure, in shaping pay-performance sensitivity using a large sample of Australian firms over 
2000-2009. They find monitoring by outside blockholders increases the sensitivity of long-term at-risk 
pay-to-performance, thereby better aligning manager and shareholder interests. However, insider 
blockholders increase (decrease) the sensitivity of cash bonuses (long-term at-risk pay) to performance, 
indicative of differences in the horizons of managers and outsiders. They also find that larger boards are 
associated with lower sensitivity of at-risk pay, consistent with them affording less effective monitoring. 
Monem and Ng (2013) consider a unique setting where the ‘two-strikes’ rule (i.e., the ‘say-on-pay’ 
legislation) was first introduced in Australia in 2011, and investigate the consequences of the regulatory 
change for pay-performance sensitivity. Using a sample of 104 firms in 2011 and 105 firms in 2012 that 
experienced the ‘first strike’, they find no difference in pay-performance sensitivity between the ‘first 
strike’ firms and the control firms. Shareholder voting power (measured by the ratio of ‘no’ votes to the 
total number of votes) has little impact on the pay-performance link. They conclude that the 
shareholders of the ‘first-strike’ firms may have been over-enthusiastic about their voting power in 2011 
but exercised this power more judiciously in 2012, as the pay-performance relations improved slightly in 
2012. 
It is important to note that most Australian studies do not consider changes in the value of the CEO’s 
stock and option portfolio as a significant component of total compensation (Jensen and Murphy, 1990; 
Core et al., 2003), partly due to the unavailability of CEO ownership data. Some studies argue that the 
rationale for excluding such changes in the CEO’s wealth in assessing the pay-performance sensitivity is 
that rational shareholders are more likely to focus on compensation granted in the current year than on 
wealth accumulated through past equity and option grants, at least in the scenario they examine (for 
example, ‘say on pay’ as in Monem and Ng, 2013). However, a comprehensive measure of CEO 
incentives (pay-performance sensitivity) should take all possible links between firm performance and 
CEO wealth into account. The exclusion of changes in the value of the CEO’s stock and option portfolio 
therefore is likely to systematically underestimate the level of incentives (Jensen and Murphy, 1990; 
Frydman and Jenter, 2010). 
4.4.4 CEO pay, firm performance and corporate actions 
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There is very limited Australian empirical evidence on the effect of CEO compensation on firm 
performance and corporate actions. To our knowledge, there are only three studies that present 
preliminary evidence in the area of firm performance (Matolcsy and Wright, 2011), merger and 
acquisitions (Bugeja et al., 2012) and corporate investment (Li et al., 2011). Therefore, future research 
with careful design and an insightful setting is particularly needed to enrich our understanding of CEO 
compensation in Australia. 
Matolcsy and Wright (2011) use 3,053 firm-years drawn from 1999-2005 disclosures made by Top 
500 firms to investigate efficient and inefficient CEO compensation structures, and their effects on firm 
performance. Approximately 30% of these firm-years have cash only compensation systems, while the 
remaining firms use both cash and equity-based compensation. They predict that firms that adopt CEO 
compensation structures that deviate from the ‘efficient compensation structure’ have lower 
performance than firms that have an efficient structure. Performance is measured using both 
accounting-based measures (return on assets and return on equity) and market-based measures (fully-
diluted change in the stock price and fully-diluted change in the stock price adjusted for CAPM beta risk). 
They estimate a cross-sectional logit model using data for all firm-years11 where the dependent variable 
equals one for the equity-based group and two for the cash group. The independent variables include 
proxies for size, the market-to-book ratio, firm performance, earnings volatility, leverage and CEO and 
blockholder ownership. The logit model results are then used to “predict which compensation group a 
firm could belong to” (p. 755). The performance of firms in and not in the predicted group is then 
investigated12, with those not in the ‘optimal’ group predicted to have worse performance. The results 
confirm this prediction for all four performance measures. 
Bugeja et al. (2012) investigate CEO compensation in mergers and acquisitions and conclude that 
overall their findings are more consistent with the predictions of incentive alignment effects of efficient 
contracting than managerial power theory, albeit that these theories are not mutually exclusive and that 
some evidence is consistent with managerial power. They use a sample of 177 M&A deals and 4,002 
control firms drawn from 2000 to 2007 and show that CEO compensation increases significantly in the 
M&A completion year and the subsequent year. All components of CEO compensation (salary only, 
bonus only, salary and bonus, shares, options and total compensation) are found to increase. CEOs with 
                                                          
11
 Matolcsy and Wright (2011) also estimate this logit model each year and find results that are generally the same 
as the main results with respect to sign of the ‘wrong group’ dummy, though not all cases are statistically 
significant. 
12
 Approximately 95 per cent of the equity group and 25 per cent of the cash group are correctly predicted. 
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longer tenure and those with bigger boards are paid more, as too are CEOs of deals that have a more 
negative announcement effect (consistent with managerial power) however other measures of 
managerial power (CEO on the nominating committee, higher CEO ownership and the proportion of 
insiders on the board) are significantly negatively related to CEO compensation (consistent with efficient 
contracting). The study also shows that CEO compensation in acquiring firms is positively related to 
measures of performance (return on assets and stock market performance). Finally CEOs are paid more 
for bigger takeovers, if they acquire targets in different industries and if they revise (upwards) the 
original offer price to the target. 
Li et al. (2011) provide some preliminary evidence on the relation between executive compensation 
and corporate investment for the period over 2004-2007. They document a significant positive relation 
between corporate investment levels and equity-based compensation for all executives and directors 
relative to market value of equity. However, the relation is not significant when equity-based 
compensation is measured as a ratio of total compensation for all executives and directors. Li et al. 
(2011) argue that equity-based compensation relative to market value of equity has a more direct link 
with shareholders’ wealth, and suggest that managers make investment decisions that positively affect 
their equity-based compensation. 
 
5. DESIGN PRINCIPLES 
Murphy (2013) concludes (in part) his comprehensive analysis of the evolution of US CEO 
remuneration with the following: “Indeed, what makes CEO pay both interesting and complicated is the 
fact that the efficient contracting, managerial power, and political paradigms co-exist and interact” 
(Murphy, 2013, p. 346). Similarly Ferrarini et al.’s (2009) survey of European regulation on CEO 
remuneration highlights that: “Establishing rules or guidelines on optimal pay, which also respond to 
public concerns with respect to fairness, is not an easy task” (Ferrarini et al., 2009, p. 5). Nonetheless, 
we ‘put our heads on the chopping block’ by outlining a set of design principles for executive 
compensation contracts. Our motive is in to generate debate, discussion and hopefully consensus. 
Cronqvist and Fahlenbrach (2012) investigate the way CEO compensation contracts change when 
public firms are acquired in a leveraged buyout (LBO) by private equity firms, which the authors regard 
as among the most financially sophisticated principals in US capital markets. A (small and non-random) 
33 
 
sample of 20 large LBOs made between 2005 and 2007 by the largest US private equity firms is used. 
They find several contract features, but not all, are redesigned, as follows: 
 CEO base salary and bonuses increase by around 25 per cent, particularly when new executives 
are hired to work in these highly levered organisations. 
 A more performance-sensitive contract is negotiated where CEO effort is important. Contracts 
are redesigned so as to avoid qualitative, nonfinancial and earnings-based measures. Cash-flow 
based measures, such as earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization (EBITDA) 
that allow less accounting discretion than earnings, are adopted for short-term measures of 
performance. Longer term performance is measured using internal rates of return (IRR) or 
multiples of estimated firm value to acquisition price. A common contract provision is that about 
50 per cent of equity grants will performance-vest if IRR and multiple hurdles are met at exit. 
 CEO severance pay multipliers remain unchanged. 
 Unvested options and restricted stock grants are typically forfeited if a CEO is dismissed. 
 The sale of vested shares for dismissed executives is restricted, typically through a right of first 
refusal and limits on the set of parties that can acquire vested stock. Dismissed CEOs find it 
practically impossible to unwind their vested equity positions. 
 Perquisites, such as personal usage of firm assets and tax gross-ups, remain unchanged after the 
PE transaction.  
Murphy and Jensen (2011) argue that their research and consulting experience leads to a conclusion 
that almost all CEO and executive bonus plans are deeply flawed, resulting in counterproductive 
incentives and decisions that harm shareholders. Their paper first describes a typical bonus plan and 
then moves to a discussion of using the wrong pay-performance relationships, the wrong standards or 
targets, the wrong performance measures, ex-post adjustment to bonuses (including clawbacks) and the 
role of banking bonuses in the GFC. The paper contains a series of 10 recommendations for bonus plan 
design. 
A typical bonus plan, drawn from Murphy and Jensen (2011, p. 4) is depicted below: 
 
 





Typical bonus plan, often referred to by compensation consultants as an ‘80/120 plan’. A 
performance target and a target bonus for meeting that performance are set. Upper and lower 
performance thresholds are established which create an ‘incentive zone’ within which the bonus 
increases with performance. Bonuses do not vary with performance outside the range established by 
the Lower and Upper Performance thresholds. A Hurdle Bonus is often paid when the executive 
reaches the lower performance threshold. The bonus can increase linearly with performance in the 
incentive zone (as shown here) or it can increase at a decreasing rate or an increasing rate (that is, the 
line can be convex or concave). 
 
Murphy and Jensen (2011) argue that Figure 1 “is replete with incentive problems that destroy 
value”. Suppose a CEO has an upper hurdle for ROE of 15 per cent, but is confident that the firm can 
easily surpass that threshold. A CEO they interviewed stated “I’d have to be the stupidest CEO in the 
world to report an ROE of 18%. First, I wouldn’t get any bonus for any results above the cap. Second, I 
could have saved some of our earnings for next year. And third, [the board of directors] would increase 
my target performance for next year.” A bonus plan like this also motivates earnings management, 
sometimes taking a ‘big bath’ and it encourages low-balling in setting performance targets. They are also 
short-term in their focus. And, importantly, the pay-performance relationship is non-linear. 
Accordingly, Murphy and Jensen recommend (R1) that non-linear pay-performance be replaced by 
linear plans. The typical bonus plan in Figure 1 above also encourages people to lie. Accordingly Murphy 
and Jensen (2011, p. 19) recommend (R2) the separating of the budgeting process from the targets set 
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in compensation formulas. It is clear that allowing managers to select their peer group for performance 
evaluation potentially involves perverse incentives, accordingly R3 states that executives should not be 
responsible for selecting the comparison group. It is also clear that a benchmark set this year that 
incorporates prior-year performance will ensure that executives who perform well in one year will be 
penalized the next. Accordingly R4 states that current year incentives should not be tied to prior 
performance while R5 states that incentive payments should not be tied benchmarks that the CEO can 
influence. 
It has been long-recognized that ratios can be affected by altering the numerator or the 
denominator. Typically bonus plans want to encourage the numerator to be increased (because the 
numerator typically uses measures such as revenue, earnings, EBIDTA) however the value of ratio can be 
increased if the denominator is managed downward. Typically managing the value of the denominator 
downward (assets, sales or equity) is value destroying. Murphy and Jensen (2011) somewhat 
controversially recommend, given the prevalence of measures such as ROA or ROE13, in R6 that ratios 
should not be used as performance measures. 
CEOs can and do influence capital structure and a firms’ cost of capital. The distinction between 
accounting profit and economic profit (Economic profit = Accounting profit - Cost of capital X Amount of 
capital) is that economic profit incorporates the opportunity cost of capital employed in the firm. R7 
recommends that performance measures should incorporate the cost of equity capital. It is virtually 
impossible to make fool-proof objective and accurate measures of the contribution of an individual to 
firm value. Accordingly Murphy and Jensen suggest that compensation committees should have the 
power to make after-the-fact ex post adjustments to both the measure of CEO performance and the 
compensation actually paid to the CEO. Accordingly they make a series of recommendations (R8 to R10) 
to address these concerns, as follows: 
 R8 recommends that incentive plans should include a subjective component.  
 R9 requires that CEOs should be held accountable for factors that are beyond their control if 
they can control or affect the impact of those uncontrollable factors on performance, and  
                                                          
13
 Murphy and Jensen (2011, pp. 35-37) show that ratio measures can quite easily be converted to ‘valid’ 
performance hurdles providing the compensation committee decides on an appropriate proportion of the dollar 
amount of the numerator of a ratio as going into a bonus pool. 
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 R10 recommends that incentive programs should provide for clawback of rewards, especially 
when data were manipulated or fraudulent. Bonus banks or deferred compensation are 
recommended. 
 
While we agree with many of the recommendations made by Murphy and Jensen (2011) we came 
up, quite independently with a different set of principles. Murphy and Jensen’s recommendations focus 
on bonus plans, while ours are somewhat broader in scope. In developing these principles we were 
encouraged by colleagues to set out our views in the spirit of having a blank sheet of paper, though 
recognizing that the separation of ownership and control, and the attendant agency and incentive 
problems that result, need to be incorporated into CEO compensation contracts. Here is our list. 
1. Executive compensation should consist of two broad elements, a base pay and a flexible bonus 
element. 
2. The base pay should be set taking into account the market for managerial talent. It can be 
adjusted to reflect changes in the market for managerial talent. 
3. The bonus element should be based on performance of the firm, and its payment should vest 
over several years depending on performance outcomes over those years. 
4. The bonus amount or bonus pool should be based on a share of the risk-adjusted wealth 
increase that shareholders have achieved in the contemporaneous period. 
5. Bonus payments can be divided into equity-linked, cash and perquisite components. It should be 
recognized that a CEO values equity-linked compensation at less than the cost of those awards 
to shareholders. 
6. Equity-based compensation grants should be adjusted for dividend payments. The exercise price 
of executive options should be adjusted downward, while restricted stock should have dividend 
entitlements and the entitlement to shares should be adjusted upward by assuming the 
dividend is re-invested to acquire additional stock.  
7. Performance measurement is subject to measurement error, and accordingly performance 
should be classified as (i) statistically superior to the benchmark (ii) statistically indistinguishable 
from the benchmark and (iii) statistically below the benchmark. Performance that is statistically 
below the benchmark should result in no bonus reward for the current period. The performance 
bonus should be higher for statistically superior performance than it is for performance that is 
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statistically indistinguishable from the benchmark. The performance rankings should be 
positively correlated to the bonus pool. 
8. Firm performance should be measured relative to an appropriate independently selected set of 
peers taking risk into account. Bonus awards should be based on a measure of abnormal 
performance calculated as the firm’s actual performance less the performance that is expected, 
given the actual performance of the benchmark peers. Firms with listed securities should use 
sharemarket returns in assessing abnormal performance, if the securities are efficiently priced14. 
Audited accounting-based measures of performance can also be used providing that these are 
prepared on a consistent basis. Audited cash-flow measures of performance should be used as a 
check on the reasonableness of earnings measures. Accounting measures of performance 
should be adjusted for the cost of capital. 
9. Termination payments should be a function of the benchmark adjusted performance of the firm 
during the tenure of the executive. Three broad categories of performance (as in 7 above) 
should be developed. Entitlements to incentive payments that have been earned but that have 
not yet vested should vest on a CEOs resignation, however these should be subject to some 
clawback. A CEO who is dismissed for poor performance or inappropriate or illegal conduct 
should receive no termination bonuses. 
 
We illustrate the application of the measurement of the performance element for six prominent ASX 
listed companies (not randomly selected) in Table 10. The six companies, and their CEOs and 
appointment terms are as follows: 
1. Telstra Corporation Limited (ASX code TLS). We evaluate the performance of BHP during the 
term of Solomon Trujillo, who was the CEO from July 2005 to May 2009. 
2. Air New Zealand (ASX code AIZ). Robert Fyfe was appointed as the CEO in October 2005, and left 
his position in December 2012. 
                                                          
14
 In Cammer v. Bloom (1989) Civil Action No. 88-2458, United States District Court for the District of New Jersey, 
Judge Alfred J. Lechnmer outlined five factors that have become known as the ‘Crammer factors’ that that would 
help establish whether a security traded in an efficient market. Since then, dozens of courts have relied on the five 
‘Cammer factors’ in evaluating market efficiency. The factors are “(1) the stock’s average weekly trading volume; 
(2) the number of securities analysts that followed and reported on the stock; (3) the presence of market makers 
and arbitrageurs; (4) the company’s eligibility to file a Form S-3 Registration Statement; and (5) a cause-and-effect 
relationship, over time, between unexpected corporate events or financial releases and an immediate response in 
stock price. Since then Courts have supplemented the five Cammer factors with other measures such as market 
capitalization, bid/ask spread, float, and analyses of autocorrelation.  
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3. Caltex Australia Limited (ASX code CTX). David Reeves who was the CEO from August 2003 to 
May 2006. 
4. QGC Pty Limited (formerly Queensland Gas Company Limited, ASX code QGC). Richard Cotte was 
the CEO from October 2002 to November 2008. 
5. Mirvac Group (ASX code MGR). Gregory Paramor was appointed as the CEO in June 2001, and 
resigned in May 2011. 
6. Clough Limited (ASX code CLO). David Singleton was the CEO from August 2003 to January 2007. 
For each of these companies we estimated the CAPM, the Market Model, the Fama-French three-
factor model and the Carhart four-factor model using data from the SPPR database held at Sirca over the 
period of time during which the CEOs listed above were in that position.15 The index value we used is a 
weighted value of all companies in the SPPR database. For illustration we used monthly returns, though 
SPPR does allow these models to be estimated with more granular observations. Our results are 
presented in Panel A and Panel B of Table 10, where the results in Panel B are based on returns adjusted 
for dividend imputation franking credits. In summary, the results in Panel A show that:  
 Caltex and QGC have a significant positive α, ranging from 4.44 to 5.48 per cent per month. 
David Reeves and Richard Cottee would be judged to have delivered significant shareholder 
wealth creation, and hence they would be entitled to participate in the full bonus pool. This 
bonus however would not be paid immediately, and would vest over several years, in 
accordance with principle 3. 
 The α of Telstra, Air New Zealand (AirNZ) and Mirvac is insignificantly different from zero. 
Hence Solomon Trujillo, Robert Fyfe and Gregory Paramor (Mirvac Group), while not 
delivering significantly positive performance, was the CEO during a period where TLS, CBA 
and Mirvac respectively earned, on a risk-adjusted performance, almost exactly what would 
be expected under the CAPM, the Market Model or the multifactor models. During this 
period of time Solomon Trujillo and Robert Fyfe would earn a bonus, though it would not be 
the full award. Gregory Paramor had performance that was also statistically 
indistinguishable from zero, and hence would be considered for a bonus payment. His bonus 
would however be lower than that for the Telstra and AirNZ CEOs. In all three cases these 
bonus payments would vest over several years. 
                                                          
15
 We thank Adrian Lee for sharing the series of pricing factors in Australia. 
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 David Singleton managed Clough Limited during a period of time where the risk-adjusted 
sharemarket performance was significantly negative. He would be not entitled to 
performance-based incentive payments or a termination bonus. 
 
The results in Panel B of Table 10 are qualitatively and quantitatively similar to those in Panel A, 
suggesting that, for the six prominent ASX listed companies, the adjustment for dividend imputation 
franking credits does not alter the evaluation of risk-adjusted sharemarket performance over the period 
of time during which the CEOs were in the position. 
Table 11 shows the distribution of α estimated from four different models for all Australian CEOs 
who were in the position for at least one year. The date of CEO appointment and the date of resignation 
are sourced from Sirca Limited and Boardroom. We only consider CEOs who have left their position 
because both databases contain a large number of missing or obviously incorrect values in either date of 
appointment or date of resignation. Due to estimation requirement, we use monthly stock price data 
and only examine CEOs who were in the position for at least 12 months. To ensure the efficiency of the 
security prices, we eliminate observations with stale closing price (i.e., the closing price of current 
month comes from an earlier month). Below are observations on the estimated α for four different 
models without (Panel A) and with (Panel B) adjustment for dividend imputation franking credits: 
 The mean value of estimated α for CAPM is positive (0.0003), while the other three models 
report a negative mean value of α. The estimated α from the multifactor models tends to 
be more dispersed, with a higher standard deviation compared to that of the CAPM and the 
Market model.  
 The risk-adjusted sharemarket performance during the period when CEOs were in the 
position is positive for 52.6% and 51.1% of CEOs respectively according to the CAPM and 
the Market model. The ratio of positive α is lower for the multifactor models. Consistently, 
the ratio of negative α for the CAPM and the Market model is lower than that for the 
multifactor models. Similarly, the number and percentage of statistically significant positive 
α is higher for the CAPM (12.2%) and the Market model (11.5%), while the multifactor 
models result in a higher percentage of significantly negative α (12.2% and 11.2% 
respectively).  
 After the adjustment for dividend imputation franking credits, the ratio of positive 
(negative) α becomes lower (higher) compared to the estimates with no adjustment. For 
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example, the risk-adjusted sharemarket performance during the period when CEOs were in 
the position is positive for 51.1% and 45.8% of CEOs respectively according to the CAPM 
and the Fama-French three-factor model. Importantly, the number and percentage of 
statistically significant positive α is higher for the CAPM (12.6% compared to 12.2% without 
adjustment), and the percentage of negative α is also higher (10.4% compared to 9.5%). 
This confirms the importance of accounting for dividend imputation franking credits when 
evaluating risk-adjusted sharemarket performance. 
We also compare the estimated α between CEOs who had been in the position for more than three 
years (‘long-service CEO’) and those who worked as the CEO for less than three year (‘short-service 
CEO’). Importantly, we find that the mean value of the estimated α for ‘long-service CEOs’ is positive for 
all four models, and is higher than the mean negative α for ‘short-service CEOs’. The risk-adjusted 
sharemarket performance for ‘long-service CEOs’ has a higher percentage of positive and significant 
values, and a lower percentage of negative estimated values, compared to ‘short-service CEOs’. 
Consistent with the above results, the ratio of positive (negative) α becomes lower (higher) after 
adjusting for dividend imputation franking credits. However, the percentage of statistically significant α 
(either positive or negative) is generally higher for the CAPM model and the multifactor models. 
Graphical representations of the distribution of estimated α for all CEOs, ‘long-service CEOs’ and 
‘short-service CEOs’ estimated from the CAPM and the Fama-French three-factor model are reported in 
Figures 7, 8 and 9. 
 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
Executive compensation has been controversial for several decades. Recent controversies over 
executive pay have sparked outrage from some sectors and calls for increased regulation and reform. 
Yet others argue that knee-jerk reactions to perceived abuses of pay can lead to a host of unintended 
and inefficient outcomes. This paper argues that much of this controversy is due to executives being 
rewarded via contracts that have weaknesses in design. We argue that few stakeholders in firms would 
object to generous appropriately generous compensation for managers whose performance results in 
abnormally high long-term shareholder wealth creation. We state a set of nine design principles, 
developed from our intuition and a review of the extensive theoretical, regulatory and empirical 
literature, that we suggest should be the fundamental building blocks for designing executive 
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remuneration systems in public firms, especially where ownership and control is separated. Our purpose 
is to generate broad debate and discussion hopefully leading to a consensus as to the principles that 
should be present in all executive compensation contracts such that the interests of shareholders and 
managers are aligned. 
We illustrated the principles we have developed using six well-known ASX listed firms managed by 
high-profile CEOs. While these firms were not chosen randomly, the illustration is robust to the various 
methods we use to estimate risk-adjusted sharemarket performance.  




Table 1: Mean and median CEO compensation for all firms included in the Sirca Limited corporate governance database for 2001 to 2012, where 
all dollar values are adjusted to December 2012 dollars using the Australian CPI*. 
 





























Years 11282 817,514 78.5% 210,460 20.2% 1,041,461   410,714 87.8% 57,228 12.2% 467,942  
2001 881 648,519 90.8% 61,092 8.6% 714,343    341,181 96.1% 13,958 3.9% 355,140   
2002 903 701,938 88.9% 86,480 11.0% 789,604 10.5%  355,333 97.7% 8,414 2.3% 363,747 2.4% 
2003 914 739,514 85.8% 109,340 12.7% 862,358 9.2%  362,324 94.4% 21,385 5.6% 383,709 5.5% 
2004 974 775,085 86.2% 122,884 13.7% 899,062 4.3%  357,455 89.8% 40,650 10.2% 398,105 3.8% 
2005 1006 805,358 82.2% 172,032 17.6% 979,186 8.9%  376,226 87.2% 55,133 12.8% 431,359 8.4% 
2006 1020 829,540 76.2% 217,094 19.9% 1,088,945 11.2%  409,182 84.7% 73,707 15.3% 482,888 11.9% 
2007 1030 924,135 73.4% 325,896 25.9% 1,258,379 15.6%  417,678 80.5% 100,946 19.5% 518,624 7.4% 
2008 991 876,693 73.4% 292,323 24.5% 1,194,480 -5.1%  436,681 79.9% 109,597 20.1% 546,278 5.3% 
2009 961 909,694 78.4% 244,783 21.1% 1,160,065 -2.9%  448,710 87.0% 67,167 13.0% 515,877 -5.6% 
2010 921 844,823 72.8% 298,773 25.8% 1,159,731 0.0%  470,389 85.0% 82,784 15.0% 553,173 7.2% 
2011 890 846,664 73.3% 283,934 24.6% 1,155,101 -0.4%  487,491 83.7% 94,874 16.3% 582,365 5.3% 
2012 791 890,532 73.6% 303,287 25.1% 1,209,961 4.7%  533,598 82.8% 110,724 17.2% 644,322 10.6% 
 
*Small differences between total compensation and the sum of cash compensation and equity compensation are caused by small 





Table 2: Mean and median CEO compensation for top 100 firms included in the Sirca Limited corporate governance database for 2001 to 2012, 
where all dollar values are adjusted to December 2012 dollars using the Australian CPI*. 
 





























Years 1200 3,135,036 75.0% 963,287 23.0% 4,180,499   2,358,037 76.6% 721,731 23.4% 3,079,769  
2001 100 2,333,923 90.8% 234,287 9.1% 2,569,813    1,659,105 91.0% 163,307 9.0% 1,822,413   
2002 100 2,663,347 84.1% 494,395 15.6% 3,168,454 23.3%  1,887,424 80.3% 463,369 19.7% 2,350,792 29.0% 
2003 100 2,867,706 77.7% 708,625 19.2% 3,689,757 16.5%  1,952,863 81.0% 457,727 19.0% 2,410,590 2.5% 
2004 100 3,458,661 84.4% 636,293 15.5% 4,095,924 11.0%  2,745,374 84.0% 524,813 16.0% 3,270,187 35.7% 
2005 100 3,623,498 80.6% 864,354 19.2% 4,495,180 9.7%  2,507,077 82.2% 543,278 17.8% 3,050,356 -6.7% 
2006 100 3,404,534 72.4% 973,717 20.7% 4,703,288 4.6%  2,728,890 78.8% 732,984 21.2% 3,461,874 13.5% 
2007 100 4,252,072 72.2% 1,573,407 26.7% 5,889,643 25.2%  3,001,960 73.3% 1,094,308 26.7% 4,096,268 18.3% 
2008 100 3,636,509 71.1% 1,288,573 25.2% 5,114,690 -13.2%  2,608,688 67.7% 1,243,240 32.3% 3,851,928 -6.0% 
2009 100 2,996,897 71.5% 1,178,963 28.1% 4,192,006 -18.0%  2,470,031 72.1% 955,587 27.9% 3,425,618 -11.1% 
2010 100 2,938,895 68.2% 1,283,889 29.8% 4,312,291 2.9%  2,396,190 74.7% 812,166 25.3% 3,208,356 -6.3% 
2011 100 2,900,287 69.2% 1,183,582 28.2% 4,190,639 -2.8%  2,611,368 75.5% 848,309 24.5% 3,459,677 7.8% 
2012 100 2,544,108 67.9% 1,139,360 30.4% 3,744,298 -10.7%  1,822,967 68.8% 826,889 31.2% 2,649,856 -23.4% 
 
*Small differences between total compensation and the sum of cash compensation and equity compensation are caused by small 






Table 3: Mean and median CEO compensation for Top 200 firms included in the Sirca Limited corporate governance database for 2001 to 2012, 
where all dollar values are adjusted to December 2012 dollars using the Australian CPI*. 
 





























Years 2400 2,241,826 76.9% 627,240 21.5% 2,916,199   1,489,273 81.9% 328,253 18.1% 1,817,526  
2001 200 1,640,914 89.1% 193,858 10.5% 1,842,285    1,015,393 87.2% 149,579 12.8% 1,164,972   
2002 200 1,852,749 86.2% 290,161 13.5% 2,148,266 16.6%  1,166,278 92.7% 92,154 7.3% 1,258,432 8.0% 
2003 200 2,064,860 81.6% 409,900 16.2% 2,531,540 17.8%  1,297,066 84.5% 237,756 15.5% 1,534,821 22.0% 
2004 200 2,343,696 85.4% 398,949 14.5% 2,745,960 8.5%  1,554,318 91.6% 142,934 8.4% 1,697,252 10.6% 
2005 200 2,440,173 80.8% 574,346 19.0% 3,021,027 10.0%  1,628,186 88.3% 214,806 11.7% 1,842,992 8.6% 
2006 200 2,480,314 75.3% 648,602 19.7% 3,293,075 9.0%  1,731,568 82.6% 365,363 17.4% 2,096,931 13.8% 
2007 200 2,881,771 72.4% 1,064,460 26.7% 3,982,271 20.9%  1,812,121 71.5% 721,247 28.5% 2,533,369 20.8% 
2008 200 2,505,782 72.0% 867,355 24.9% 3,480,240 -12.6%  1,671,378 72.6% 630,405 27.4% 2,301,783 -9.1% 
2009 200 2,576,046 76.7% 771,156 23.0% 3,358,419 -3.5%  1,554,304 76.3% 482,855 23.7% 2,037,159 -11.5% 
2010 200 2,185,658 71.1% 832,632 27.1% 3,072,018 -8.5%  1,565,365 71.9% 611,972 28.1% 2,177,337 6.9% 
2011 200 2,071,825 71.1% 771,881 26.5% 2,914,515 -5.1%  1,481,272 69.6% 647,142 30.4% 2,128,414 -2.2% 
2012 200 1,858,121 71.3% 703,579 27.0% 2,604,775 -10.6%  1,323,633 73.5% 476,189 26.5% 1,799,822 -15.4% 
 
*Small differences between total compensation and the sum of cash compensation and equity compensation are caused by small 






Table 4: Mean and median CEO compensation for Top 300 firms included in the Sirca Limited corporate governance database for 2001 to 2012, 
where all dollar values are adjusted to December 2012 dollars using the Australian CPI*. 
 





























Years 3600 1,756,038 76.9% 489,265 21.4% 2,282,457   1,024,675 80.0% 255,833 20.0% 1,280,508  
2001 300 1,302,150 89.6% 142,175 9.8% 1,453,272    736,123 90.0% 82,209 10.0% 818,333   
2002 300 1,464,261 86.6% 223,828 13.2% 1,691,659 16.4%  832,458 93.3% 59,794 6.7% 892,251 9.0% 
2003 300 1,606,836 82.9% 291,155 15.0% 1,939,025 14.6%  953,794 93.4% 67,758 6.6% 1,021,552 14.5% 
2004 300 1,797,454 85.5% 300,729 14.3% 2,101,774 8.4%  1,055,795 81.8% 234,249 18.2% 1,290,044 26.3% 
2005 300 1,893,347 81.4% 428,442 18.4% 2,327,229 10.7%  1,079,181 78.4% 297,651 21.6% 1,376,832 6.7% 
2006 300 1,954,341 74.2% 539,941 20.5% 2,635,639 13.3%  1,196,698 78.4% 329,565 21.6% 1,526,263 10.9% 
2007 300 2,219,489 72.5% 813,053 26.6% 3,059,856 16.1%  1,167,066 71.9% 456,917 28.1% 1,623,983 6.4% 
2008 300 1,958,537 73.0% 647,056 24.1% 2,682,101 -12.3%  1,133,935 72.6% 428,406 27.4% 1,562,341 -3.8% 
2009 300 1,990,537 76.2% 613,256 23.5% 2,613,107 -2.6%  1,085,633 76.5% 333,256 23.5% 1,418,889 -9.2% 
2010 300 1,732,574 69.3% 726,788 29.1% 2,499,055 -4.4%  1,064,996 72.6% 401,627 27.4% 1,466,623 3.4% 
2011 300 1,650,721 71.4% 603,577 26.1% 2,311,992 -7.5%  1,144,030 76.1% 359,916 23.9% 1,503,946 2.5% 
2012 300 1,502,209 72.4% 541,179 26.1% 2,074,778 -10.3%  973,203 78.8% 261,887 21.2% 1,235,091 -17.9% 
 
*Small differences between total compensation and the sum of cash compensation and equity compensation are caused by small 






Table 5: Mean and median CEO compensation for Top 101-300 firms included in the Sirca Limited corporate governance database for 2001 to 
2012, where all dollar values are adjusted to December 2012 dollars using the Australian CPI*. 
 





























Years 2400 1,066,539 80.0% 252,254 18.9% 1,333,437   769,856 83.1% 156,780 16.9% 926,636  
2001 200 786,263 87.9% 96,119 10.7% 895,002    622,100 96.7% 21,099 3.3% 643,199   
2002 200 864,718 90.7% 88,544 9.3% 953,262 6.5%  674,713 93.5% 47,179 6.5% 721,892 12.2% 
2003 200 976,401 91.8% 82,420 7.7% 1,063,658 11.6%  735,399 93.1% 54,177 6.9% 789,576 9.4% 
2004 200 966,851 87.5% 132,947 12.0% 1,104,699 3.9%  786,197 87.6% 110,821 12.4% 897,018 13.6% 
2005 200 1,028,272 82.7% 210,486 16.9% 1,243,254 12.5%  796,085 86.9% 119,531 13.1% 915,617 2.1% 
2006 200 1,229,245 76.7% 323,053 20.2% 1,601,814 28.8%  847,945 77.7% 243,628 22.3% 1,091,573 19.2% 
2007 200 1,203,197 73.1% 432,876 26.3% 1,644,962 2.7%  852,197 73.6% 305,108 26.4% 1,157,306 6.0% 
2008 200 1,119,550 76.4% 326,298 22.3% 1,465,807 -10.9%  820,979 79.3% 214,300 20.7% 1,035,279 -10.5% 
2009 200 1,487,358 81.6% 330,403 18.1% 1,823,658 24.4%  801,670 75.1% 266,230 24.9% 1,067,900 3.2% 
2010 200 1,129,414 70.9% 448,238 28.1% 1,592,437 -12.7%  813,124 74.1% 284,919 25.9% 1,098,042 2.8% 
2011 200 1,025,938 74.7% 313,574 22.8% 1,372,669 -13.8%  857,561 73.3% 312,691 26.7% 1,170,252 6.6% 
2012 200 981,260 79.1% 242,088 19.5% 1,240,017 -9.7%  806,288 80.2% 199,413 19.8% 1,005,701 -14.1% 
 
*Small differences between total compensation and the sum of cash compensation and equity compensation are caused by small 






Table 6: Mean and median CEO compensation for non-Top 300 firms included in the Sirca Limited corporate governance database for 2001 to 
2012, where all dollar values are adjusted to December 2012 dollars using the Australian CPI*. 
 





























Years 7682 377,638 82.1% 79,804 17.4% 459,819   307,142 90.0% 33,958 10.0% 341,100  
2001 581 311,015 93.5% 19,226 5.8% 332,797    269,132 97.0% 8,439 3.0% 277,570   
2002 603 322,673 94.7% 18,147 5.3% 340,821 2.4%  263,871 98.3% 4,490 1.7% 268,360 -3.3% 
2003 614 315,742 93.9% 20,506 6.1% 336,299 -1.3%  273,175 96.7% 9,380 3.3% 282,555 5.3% 
2004 674 320,025 88.0% 43,724 12.0% 363,731 8.2%  258,322 93.9% 16,636 6.1% 274,958 -2.7% 
2005 706 343,040 84.4% 63,075 15.5% 406,364 11.7%  290,557 89.6% 33,732 10.4% 324,289 17.9% 
2006 720 360,873 81.2% 82,574 18.6% 444,489 9.4%  303,974 85.0% 53,449 15.0% 357,424 10.2% 
2007 730 391,799 75.6% 125,694 24.3% 518,045 16.5%  315,039 80.8% 74,647 19.2% 389,686 9.0% 
2008 691 407,007 74.2% 138,315 25.2% 548,624 5.9%  341,774 85.8% 56,547 14.2% 398,321 2.2% 
2009 661 419,145 83.7% 77,549 15.5% 500,591 -8.8%  349,839 90.6% 36,421 9.4% 386,259 -3.0% 
2010 621 415,958 81.1% 92,002 17.9% 512,714 2.4%  340,549 85.2% 59,221 14.8% 399,770 3.5% 
2011 590 437,822 77.2% 121,404 21.4% 566,851 10.6%  359,734 88.3% 47,447 11.7% 407,181 1.9% 
2012 491 516,035 75.8% 157,936 23.2% 680,482 20.0%  379,981 85.2% 65,796 14.8% 445,777 9.5% 
 
*Small differences between total compensation and the sum of cash compensation and equity compensation are caused by small 
amounts of other compensation. 
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Table 7: Australian empirical studies on the level of CEO compensation 
Authors Year Sample/Sources Sample 
year 










2011 663 (4,456) firms 
(firm-yeras) from 














Board structural independence does not 
affect the relation between CEO pay 
and performance. The results contradict 




2006 133 (532) firms 
(firm-years) for 









+ Past ROA(+), 
past return(X) 




Fixed salary and share-based 
components of compensation are 
consistent with efficient contracting 
explanations, while bonuses and option 




2002 258 ASX firms, 
annual report 
2000 Executive stock 
option 
+ Prior stock 
return(+) 




The ratio of options over total pay is 
positively associated with firm size and 
prior-year return, but negatively related 
to current-year ROA, CEO ownership 
and insider ownership. The results 
indicate that firms with weak corporate 




2013 143 ASX300 
firms 
2001 Total cash pay, 
and CEO bonus 
 Prior-year 
ROA(X) 
  The relation between CEO cash pay and 
prior-year performance is only 
significant in the largest 50 firms among 




















CEO pay is positively related to firm 
size, prior-year bank performance, 
prior-year stock return and institutional 
ownership, but negatively associated 



















The level of CEO compensation is 
found to be positively related to size, 
board size, growth options, and the 
separation of CEO and Chairman roles 
in the board. However, there is no 
evidence of a significant relation 
between CEO pay and firm performance 
(either accounting or market 













+  Current stock 
return(+ weak) 
 A weak positive relationship between 
CEO compensation and current period 
market performance, and a strong 
positive association between CEO pay 
and firm size, which has decreased over 
the sample period. 
Izan H, Sidhu B 
and Taylor S 
















 They find no evidence of a linkage 
between CEO cash pay and current 
period performance, as well as prior-
year performance. Firm size is 
positively related to CEO pay. 
Australian CEOs have had, at least 
compared to US CEOs, a relatively 
small proportion of total (cash) 
compensation ‘at risk’. 
Lee 2009 66 Australian 
firms, 47 
performance-






and equity pay 







CEO performance-based pay is 
positively linked to change in financial 
performance, firm size, and CEO 
duality, and is likely to reduce in case of 
a CEO change. There is no evidence of 
an association between performance-
based pay and board independence. 














 The relationship between changes in 
CEO cash compensation and changes in 
financial performance is positive during 




2006 696 firm-years 











Levels of Australian CEO compensation 
are associated with the firm’s 
underlying economic characteristics, 
with a positive relation to firm size, firm 




2007 696 firm-years 










+    Finds 34% firm-years with only cash 
pay and 66% firm-years where a 
combination of cash- and equity-based 
compensation is paid. CEO pay is 
highest in the banking and finance 
sector, but the pay levels are much 
lower than US CEOs. 
Merhebi,  
Pattenden, 
Swan and Zhou 
2006 722 (2,574) firms 
(firm-years) from 
the Top 500 firms 









 CEO pay is positively related to firm 
size, but is not related to 
contemporaneous accounting and 









1997 Salary and total 
pay 





The level of CEO base salary and total 
pay is positively related to size, but is 
not associated with firm performance, 













cash bonus and 
long-term at-
risk pay 






the ratio of 
nonexecutive 




CEO serving the 
remuneration 
committee(-) 
There is no evidence of a consistent 
relationship between the effectiveness 
of board monitoring activity and levels 
of CEO compensation. Results also 
highlight the role of blockholders 
(outside and insider) in affecting the 
pay-performance sensitivity. 
Walker 2010 50 randomly 
selected 'high-







based pay and 
equity pay 





Performance-based pay is positively 
related to firm size and growth, but is 
not significantly associated with ROA, 




Table 8: Australian empirical studies on the CEO pay-performance sensitivity 
Authors Year Sample/Sources Sample 
year 
Pay measures Pay-performance sensitivity Key findings 
Clarkson, Walker 
and Nicholls 
2011 240 (2,160) firms (firm-
years) available in each 






salary, bonus and 
equity pay 
A general improvement in pay-
performance sensitivity over 2001-
2009. The sensitivity increase is 
primarily related to enhanced 
remuneration disclosure and the non-
binding shareholder vote on the 
remuneration report. 
 
Enhanced oversight over executive remuneration 
arrangements resulting from regulatory change 
has a positive impact on the process of executive 
compensation arrangement by strengthening 
pay-performance sensitivity 
Izan H, Sidhu B 
and Taylor S 
1998 99 (488) Australian firms 
(firm-years) with available 






Preliminary evidence on pay-
performance sensitivity for total cash 
compensation shows that the 
sensitivity is close to zero. 
 
Australian CEOs have had, at least compared to 
US CEOs, a relatively small proportion of total 




2006 722 (2,574) firms (firm-
years) from ASX Top 500 
firms listed in Business 






Changes in CEO cash pay is positively 
associated with the change in current 
and lagged period shareholder wealth 
(a CEO receives a 1.16 per cent 
increase in pay for a 10 per cent 
increase in shareholder wealth). 
 
Pay-performance sensitivity and elasticity are 
positive and significant. CEO pay sensitivity 
decreases as the riskiness of the firm increases. 
The results are consistent with efficient 
contracting explanation. 
Monem and Ng 2013 104 firms in 2011 and 105 
firms in 2012 that 






There is no difference in pay-
performance sensitivity between the 
‘first strike’ firms and the control 
firms. The shareholder voting power 
has little impact on the pay-
performance sensitivity. 
The pay-performance sensitivity is not 
significant for firms that experience a ‘first 
strike’ in 2011 under the ‘two-strikes’ rule. 
However, the relations improved in 2012. The 
results suggest that the shareholders of the ‘first-
strike’ firms may have been over-enthusiastic 
about their voting power in 2011 but exercised 
this power more judiciously in 2012. 
 
Schultz, Tian and 
Twite 







known pay, cash 
bonus and long-
term at-risk pay 
The sensitivity of long-term at-risk 
pay increases with monitoring 
blockholders, but decrease with insider 
blockholders and board size. The 
sensitivity of cash bonuses increases 
with insider blockholders, and the 
sensitivity of known pay decreases 
with board size. 
Results highlight the role of blockholders 
(outside and insider) in affecting the pay-
performance sensitivity. Monitoring 
blockholders better align manager and 
shareholder interests, while insider blockholders 
have a shorter investment horizon and prefer 
short-term pay. Larger boards are found to be 




Table 9: Australian empirical studies on the effect of CEO pay on firm performance and corporate actions 
Authors Year Sample/Sources Sample 
year 
Incentive measures Corporate 
outcome 
Incentive effect and findings 
Bugeja, da Silva Rosa 
, Duong and Izan 
2012 Acquiring and target 
firms in 177 M&A 





salary, bonus, shares and 
options 
Takeovers All components of CEO compensation increase in the M&A 
completion year and the subsequent year, but target CEOs 
receive lower compensation if they are on the nominating 
committee, or have higher ownership, or the board has higher 
proportion of insiders. Results are more consistent with 
efficient contracting. 





Total equity-based pay to 
all executives and 
directors relative to total 
compensation or market 
value of equity 
Investment 
level 
There is a significant positive relation between corporate 
investment level and equity-based compensation relative to 
market value of equity, but the relation is not significant when 
equity-based compensation is measured as a ratio of total 
compensation. The results suggest that managers make 
investment decisions that concern their equity-based 
compensation. 
Matolcsy and Wright 2011 3,503 firm-years for 
top 500 Australian 









Firms that adopt CEO compensation structures that deviate 
from the ‘efficient compensation structure’ (i.e., the incorrect 
group membership in either cash or equity compensation) have 
lower accounting and market performance than firms that have 








Table 10: Sharemarket estimates of shareholder wealth creation of four ASX listed companies during the tenure of their former CEO estimated 
using (i) the CAPM, (ii) the Market Model, (iii) Fama-French three-factor model, and (iv) the Carhart four-factor model. 



























       
CAPM       
Alpha -0.49% 0.49% 4.44% 5.29% -1.37% -2.72% 
t-statistic (α=0) -0.63 0.50 2.26** 2.69*** -1.17 -1.79** 
       
Market Model       
Alpha -0.16% 0.52% 4.50% 5.48% -1.38% -2.79% 
t-statistic (α=0) -0.21 0.53 2.07** 2.73*** -1.15 -1.67* 




      
Alpha -0.65% 0.18% 5.22% 5.46% -1.35% -2.65% 
t-statistic (α=0) -0.82 0.19 2.38** 2.85*** -1.19 -1.58* 
       
Carhart Four-
factor model 
      
Alpha -0.60% 0.18% 5.31% 5.00% -1.62% -2.65% 
t-statistic (α=0) -0.75 0.19 2.36** 2.41** -1.27 -1.53* 
       
* significant at 10 per cent; ** significant at 5 per cent; *** significant at 1 per cent 
54 
 



























       
CAPM       
Alpha -0.24% 0.39% 4.48% 5.23% -1.41% -2.85% 
t-statistic (α=0) -0.32 0.40 2.22** 2.65*** -1.19 -1.84** 
       
Market Model       
Alpha 0.08% 0.43% 4.53% 5.43% -1.42% -2.92% 
t-statistic (α=0) 0.10 0.43 2.04** 2.69*** -1.17 -1.72* 




      
Alpha -0.36% 0.09% 5.27% 5.44% -1.41% -2.77% 
t-statistic (α=0) -0.47 0.09 2.35** 2.83*** -1.24 -1.62* 
       
Carhart Four-
factor model 
      
Alpha -0.31% 0.09% 5.35% 4.99% -1.69% -2.78% 
t-statistic (α=0) -0.39 0.10 2.32** 2.40** -1.32 -1.58* 
       




Table 11: Summary statistics of the alpha estimated from different models over the period of time 
during which the CEOs were in that position 
Panel A: All CEOs 
 





N 589 589 589 589 
Mean 0.0003 -0.0010 -0.0036 -0.0026 
Median 0.0009 0.0004 -0.0015 -0.0014 
Standard deviation 0.0362 0.0360 0.0413 0.0433 
Q1 -0.0170 -0.0179 -0.0216 -0.0222 
Q3 0.0147 0.0145 0.0132 0.0128 
obs(Positive) 310 301 272 276 
% Positive 52.6% 51.1% 46.2% 46.9% 
obs(Negative) 279 288 317 313 
% Negative 47.4% 48.9% 53.8% 53.1% 
obs(sig positive) 72 68 54 53 
% Sig positive 12.2% 11.5% 9.2% 9.0% 
obs(sig negative) 56 58 72 66 
% Sig negative 9.5% 9.8% 12.2% 11.2% 
 
Panel B: All CEOs (accounting for dividend imputation franking credits) 
 





N 589 589 589 589 
Mean -0.0004 -0.0017 -0.0042 -0.0031 
Median 0.0006 0.0005 -0.0017 -0.0020 
Standard deviation 0.0362 0.0360 0.0413 0.0433 
Q1 -0.0174 -0.0191 -0.0229 -0.0232 
Q3 0.0143 0.0146 0.0132 0.0136 
obs(Positive) 301 299 270 274 
% Positive 51.1% 50.8% 45.8% 46.5% 
obs(Negative) 288 290 319 315 
% Negative 48.9% 49.2% 54.2% 53.5% 
obs(sig positive) 74 64 56 56 
% Sig positive 12.6% 10.9% 9.5% 9.5% 
obs(sig negative) 61 58 74 66 
% Sig negative 10.4% 9.8% 12.6% 11.2% 
56 
 
Table 12: Summary statistics of the alpha estimated from different models over the period of time 
during which the CEOs were in that position 
Panel A: CEOs who had been in the position for more than three years 
 





N 321 321 321 321 
Mean 0.0063 0.0051 0.0020 0.0024 
Median 0.0030 0.0032 0.0010 0.0015 
Standard deviation 0.0266 0.0264 0.0260 0.0254 
Q1 -0.0056 -0.0072 -0.0110 -0.0090 
Q3 0.0160 0.0149 0.0129 0.0119 
obs(Positive) 196 190 171 174 
% Positive 61.1% 59.2% 53.3% 54.2% 
obs(Negative) 125 131 150 147 
% Negative 38.9% 40.8% 46.7% 45.8% 
obs(sig positive) 53 50 37 36 
% Sig positive 16.5% 15.6% 11.5% 11.2% 
obs(sig negative) 20 21 28 26 
% Sig negative 6.2% 6.5% 8.7% 8.1% 
 
Panel B: CEOs who had been in the position for less than three years 
 





N 268 268 268 268 
Mean -0.0069 -0.0084 -0.0103 -0.0085 
Median -0.0054 -0.0067 -0.0082 -0.0108 
Standard deviation 0.0441 0.0437 0.0534 0.0573 
Q1 -0.0288 -0.0307 -0.0407 -0.0377 
Q3 0.0137 0.0120 0.0160 0.0175 
obs(Positive) 114 111 101 102 
% Positive 42.5% 41.4% 37.7% 38.1% 
obs(Negative) 154 157 167 166 
% Negative 57.5% 58.6% 62.3% 61.9% 
obs(sig positive) 19 18 17 17 
% Sig positive 7.1% 6.7% 6.3% 6.3% 
obs(sig negative) 36 37 44 40 
% Sig negative 13.4% 13.8% 16.4% 14.9% 
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Panel C: CEOs who had been in the position for more than three years (accounting for dividend 
imputation franking credits) 
 





N 321 321 321 321 
Mean 0.0057 0.0045 0.0015 0.0019 
Median 0.0027 0.0029 0.0005 0.0011 
Standard deviation 0.0265 0.0265 0.0260 0.0254 
Q1 -0.0067 -0.0082 -0.0123 -0.0099 
Q3 0.0149 0.0152 0.0128 0.0123 
obs(Positive) 189 186 168 174 
% Positive 58.9% 57.9% 52.3% 54.2% 
obs(Negative) 132 135 153 147 
% Negative 41.1% 42.1% 47.7% 45.8% 
obs(sig positive) 54 47 41 39 
% Sig positive 16.8% 14.6% 12.8% 12.1% 
obs(sig negative) 23 22 28 27 
% Sig negative 7.2% 6.9% 8.7% 8.4% 
 
Panel D: CEOs who had been in the position for less than three years (accounting for dividend 
imputation franking credits) 
 





N 268 268 268 268 
Mean -0.0077 -0.0091 -0.0110 -0.0091 
Median -0.0060 -0.0077 -0.0091 -0.0110 
Standard deviation 0.0440 0.0438 0.0535 0.0574 
Q1 -0.0302 -0.0315 -0.0409 -0.0388 
Q3 0.0130 0.0120 0.0146 0.0170 
obs(Positive) 112 113 102 100 
% Positive 41.8% 42.2% 38.1% 37.3% 
obs(Negative) 156 155 166 168 
% Negative 58.2% 57.8% 61.9% 62.7% 
obs(sig positive) 20 17 15 17 
% Sig positive 7.5% 6.3% 5.6% 6.3% 
obs(sig negative) 38 36 46 39 
% Sig negative 14.2% 13.4% 17.2% 14.6% 
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Figure 1.Mean and median CEO compensation for all firms included in the Sirca Limited corporate 
governance database for 2001 to 2012, where all dollar values are adjusted to December 2012 dollars 






Figure 2.Mean and median CEO compensation for Top 100 firms included in the Sirca Limited corporate 
governance database for 2001 to 2012, where all dollar values are adjusted to December 2012 dollars 






Figure 3.Mean and median CEO compensation for Top 200 firms included in the Sirca Limited corporate 
governance database for 2001 to 2012, where all dollar values are adjusted to December 2012 dollars 






Figure 4.Mean and median CEO compensation for Top 300 firms included in the Sirca Limited corporate 
governance database for 2001 to 2012, where all dollar values are adjusted to December 2012 dollars 






Figure 3.Mean and median CEO compensation for Top 101-300 firms included in the Sirca Limited 
corporate governance database for 2001 to 2012, where all dollar values are adjusted to December 






Figure 6.Mean and median CEO compensation for Non Top 300 firms included in the Sirca Limited 
corporate governance database for 2001 to 2012, where all dollar values are adjusted to December 




Figure 7: The distribution of alpha estimated from the CAPM model and the Fama-French three-factor 
model over the period of time during which the CEOs were in that position 
Panel A: All CEOs for the CAPM model 
 




Panel C: All CEOs for the Fama-French three-factor model 
 
 





Figure 8: The distribution of alpha estimated from the CAPM model over the period of time during which 
the CEOs were in that position 
Panel A: CEOs who had been in the position for more than three years 
 
Panel B: CEOs who had been in the position for more than three years (accounting for dividend 




Panel C: CEOs who had been in the position for less than three years 
 
Panel D: CEOs who had been in the position for less than three years (accounting for dividend 




Figure 9: The distribution of alpha estimated from the Fama-French three-factor model over the period 
of time during which the CEOs were in that position 
Panel A: CEOs who had been in the position for more than three years 
 
Panel B: CEOs who had been in the position for more than three years (accounting for dividend 




Panel C: CEOs who had been in the position for less than three years 
 
Panel D: CEOs who had been in the position for less than three years (accounting for dividend 
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